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As the American healthcare system changes, policy makers and healthcare providers are 
in need of more data and improved analytical strategies. Researchers are taking advantage of 
changes to the healthcare system and new data to evaluate and understand policy changes and 
healthcare effectiveness. The healthcare system will be expected to do more with less and 
governments will be required to better organize and regulate healthcare markets to address public 
health concerns and fiscal necessity.  
As a result of these changes and policy concerns, economists are studying the healthcare 
system with newfound interest and newly generated questions.  The following dissertation adds 
to the economic study of health care.  Chapter 1 examines the relationship between specific 
variations of joint and several liability tort reform and the growth rate of medical expenditures.   
Chapter 2 discusses the relationship between emergency department outcomes for trauma 
patients and the patient's insurance. Lastly, chapter 3 investigates whether a patient’s insurance 
has an impact of patient outcomes and treatment patterns. Chapter 3 also evaluates the effect of 
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This dissertation seeks to investigate and understand the relationships between 
healthcare, healthcare financing and healthcare spending. It does this in three chapters. The first 
chapter investigates the relationship between tort reform laws and healthcare spending growth. 
The second chapter explores the relationship between health insurance and the treatment patterns 
for injury patients. The last chapter examines the relationship between heart attack outcomes and 
health insurance in the emergency departments using a novel method of controlling for 
underlying health status. 
 First, one explanation for increases in healthcare costs has been malpractice lawsuits.  
States have introduced several types of tort reforms in an attempt to control increases in 
healthcare costs.  This paper adds to the literature by examining how the differences in joint and 
several liability reforms affect the state-specific growth rate in healthcare expenditures. 
Additionally, the paper addresses the potential for a fundamental difference between states that 
pass different types of liability reform.  The results show that joint and several liability reforms 
that limit joint liability based on percentage of blame have statistically and economically 
significant impacts on healthcare expenditure growth rates. 
Second, health economics researchers have long known insurance status has an impact on 
the use of health care system (Hadley 2003); however, measuring the causal effect of insurance 
status on treatment decisions and outcomes has been a difficult problem for economists to tackle. 
This paper builds upon earlier work by Doyle (2005) in examining the effects of insurance status 
on injury patients in the emergency room. Doyle (2005) uses a Wisconsin sample of patients 
reporting with injuries resulting from motor vehicle accidents. The present examination improves 
on Doyle’s study by broadening the dataset, controlling for overall health status and considering 
multiple types of health shocks. I use a nationwide dataset of emergency department visits to 
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compare the differences between the effects of insurance status on treatment for patients with 
injuries from motor vehicle accidents and patients with other types of injuries while controlling 
for overall health status. This paper reaches three primary conclusions:  (1) Patients paying out of 
pocket experience worse health outcomes; (2) Patients paying out of pocket receive fewer health 
services in response to motor vehicle accident injuries and other types of injuries; and, (3) 
Despite no observed differences between patients paying out of pocket and patients receiving 
charity care, charity care patients generally received more healthcare services and had better 
health outcomes than patients with private insurance. 
The third paper investigates whether health insurance status has an impact on survival 
and admission probabilities for heart attack patients presenting through the emergency 
department. Heart attack patients are frequently used to evaluate the impact of insurance status as 
they nearly always require immediate emergency treatment. This suggests the decision to seek 
emergency treatment could be independent of the decision to purchase health insurance and 
relieves some concerns about endogeneity problems. 
To accomplish this, the paper uses a methodology from Currie, MacLeod and Van Parys 
(2016) to address endogeneity and evaluate whether the differences across different types of 
health insurance. Using data from the 2006-2011 HCUP NEDS, I show patterns in the 
probability of death, hospital admission and treatment patterns patients with a primary diagnosis 
of acute myocardial infarction, commonly known as a heart attack before, during, and after the 
Great Recession.  
This work shows the effect of insurance status, Medicare, Medicaid, out of pocket, and 
charity care with respect to privately insured patients changes across pre-recession, recession, 
and post-recession discharges. Specifically, charity care patients experience a nine percentage 
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point increase in the probability of admission between recession discharges and post-recession 
discharges. This corresponds to charity patients being 122.7% more likely to be admitted than 
similar privately insured patients. However, this work leaves open the degree to which this effect 
is a result of the end of the Great Recession or the passage of the Affordable Care and Patient 
Protection Act of 2010. Furthermore, this research does demonstrate the importance of 












For policy-makers, determining how to bend the cost curve of healthcare down is an 
incredibly important task.  Healthcare costs in the United States have increased to 17.9% of GDP 
in 2013 and are projected to increase as a proportion of GDP, to 19.6% in 2021 (National Health 
Expenditures Projections, 2011-2021).  Healthcare costs have increased much faster in the United 
States than the OECD average than in other major industrialized countries and the US cost curve 
for medical expenses lies above the cost curves for other major industrial nations. (Kaiser Family 
Foundation, 2011). 
As a result of rising healthcare costs, policy-makers have enacted different policy 
prescriptions to bend the healthcare cost curve downward. A frequently proposed solution is the 
passage of several different types of tort reform. For example, Both the Bush and Obama 
administrations have discussed the importance of a federal tort reform law to control cost growth 
(Born, Viscusi & Baker, 2006; Mello, Chandra, Gawande, & Studdert, 2010).  The Congressional 
Budget Office advocated tort reform in a letter to Sen. Orrin Hatch in 2009 (Congressional Budget 
Office) and the American Medical Association (AMA) and other professional organizations 
advocated tort reform in a letter to President Obama in 2009 (American Medical Association).  
Several states have implemented various tort reform laws (Avraham, 2011).  
Moreover, economists have repeatedly evaluated the effectiveness of such tort reform laws 
in containing healthcare costs (Avraham & Bustos 2010; Kessler & McClellan 1996; Viscusi & 
Born 2005; Avraham, Dafny, Schanzenbach 2009; Paik, Black, Hyman, Silver 2012; Sloan & 
Shadle 2009; Matteo & Matteo 1998).  These studies have approached the questions from several 
different perspectives, but have failed to reach a consensus.  Furthermore, both economic and legal 
literatures examine only the presence of liability reforms, not the specific ways liability reforms 
are written.  The main contribution of this paper is therefore considering whether different types 
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of reform to liability law across the states have different impacts on rates of healthcare spending 
growth. Additionally, this paper also uses several different strategies to evaluate the robustness of 
the results. 
I.I  Tort Reform and Healthcare Costs 
 Tort reform laws vary considerably across the states, and dissimilarities in these provisions 
may have different effects on healthcare expenditure growth.  The literature discusses different 
types of tort reform including caps on total damages, caps on non-economic damages, caps on 
punitive damages and joint and several liability reforms.1  
 Tort reform is related to healthcare costs in two primary ways, medical malpractice 
premiums and “defensive medicine.”  In their simplest form, the direct goals of tort reform are 
quite clear—to cause plaintiffs to face higher costs, lower benefits and greater uncertainty in 
damage awards (Avraham & Bustos 2010).   
 Additionally, there are also indirect goals of tort reform.  By decreasing the likelihood of 
being the defendant in a tort lawsuit, proponents of tort reform claim doctors will be less likely 
engage in “defensive medicine,” medical procedures without very few likely health benefits and 
very high financial costs only to prevent possible malpractice claims (Kessler & McClellan 1996).  
Therefore, there are many different mechanisms by which tort reform can affect healthcare costs 
and charges in the economic theory. 
 A large portion of the research on the effects of tort reform investigates the effects of 
damage caps. First, Kessler and McClellan (1996) use three years of Medicare claims to investigate 
the effect of damage caps on individual medical expenditures.  In 1984, 1987, and 1990, they show 
                                                          
1A more extensive literature review is included in the appendix in Table AI. 
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the implementation of damage caps has a negative effect on medical expenditures, while having 
no impact on measures of health outcomes.   
 These authors show a similar result in their 2002 paper reviewing the effects of damage 
caps on expenditures and health outcomes for elderly cardiac patients. Using care data from 1984 
until 1994, Kessler and McClellan (2002) investigate the effects of tort reform and managed care 
and show that damage caps have a significant negative effect on hospital expenditures. 
 However, other research has investigated the impacts of joint and several liability tort 
reforms. Joint and several liability reform (JSL) is an attempt to link liability directly to individual 
actors. Traditionally, medical liability has been viewed as joint liability, meaning any entity or 
individual associated with the injury can be held fully liable for all damages.  This allows plaintiffs 
to sue “deep pocket” actors, such as hospitals, for full damages even though they had very little to 
do with the malpractice. For example, under a regime of joint liability, a plaintiff could sue only 
the hospital and receive full payment for all damages.  Under a several liability reform, the plaintiff 
would have to sue every actor involved in the malpractice to collect full payment for damages.  
Joint and several liability reforms use several methods of limiting the application of joint liability 
and mandating the application of several liability in a variety of situations.  
 Several researchers have investigated the effects of joint and several liability reforms on 
healthcare and medical costs.  Currie and MacLeod (2008) and Carvell, Currie and MacLeod 
(2012) investigate the effects of joint and several liability reform on pregnancy complications and 
accidental death rates.  This research demonstrates that liability reform reduces pregnancy 
complications and reduces accidental death rates, suggesting tortfeasors take more care under 
regimes of several liability.  The authors conclude that doctors, knowing they must be sued for the 
plaintiff to collect full damages, are more careful. This argument does not rely on defensive 
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medicine or an increase in the number or amount of malpractice claims, but instead on an actual 
decrease in medical malpractice. 
 Researchers have also considered the effects of JSL reform on other outcomes. Avraham 
(2007) show JSL reduces the number of malpractice payments made.  Furthermore, Avraham and 
Schanzenbach (2009) and Avraham, Dafny and Schanzenbach (2010) show JSL reform deceases 
the rate of individuals covered by private insurance companies but also reduce insurance premiums 
by 1-2% respectively. Additionally, Viscusi and Born (2005) show JSL also decreases malpractice 
insurance company loss ratios and can increase malpractice insurance company profits.  They 
conclude this means malpractice companies are paying a smaller amount to plaintiffs in 
malpractice lawsuits. Lastly, Sloan and Shadle (2009) show JSL reform may decrease Medicare 
payments for hospitalizations; however, this finding was not robust to multiple specifications. 
These authors also suggest JSL must have an impact on healthcare costs. They induce JSL reform 
must decrease healthcare costs because malpractice payments are fewer and smaller and insurance 
premiums are decreasing. However, there is no direct evidence for this claim. 
 Despite several JSL reform studies, none of the existing research attempts to provide any 
direct evidence about healthcare costs or insight into the differential effects of different types of 
joint and several liability reform.  This paper builds on previous research by directly addressing 
costs by using the growth rate of healthcare costs and by examining the effects of different types 
of JSL reforms.  States have implemented JSL by banning joint liability, limiting the circumstances 
in which joint liability can be applied, and defining 'fair-share' liability laws.2 
I.II.  Data and Empirical Methods 
                                                          
2 Table AII presents the distribution of states implementing different types of joint and several liability reform. 
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I assembled panel data for states for 1996 to 2009 from a variety of different sources.  The 
primary dependent variable is the annual percentage growth in personal healthcare by state.  This 
data was collected from the 2011 Health Expenditures by State of Residence database from the 
Kaiser Family Foundation State Health Facts (http://kff.org/statedata/).  State income data were 
collected from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. The demographic variables for the states were 
collected from the U. S. Census Bureau.  Health status variables that may affect healthcare 
expenditures were collected from the CDC’s Behavioral Risk Factor Survey.  Lastly, data about 
the type and timing of tort reforms were found in the Database of State Tort Law Reforms 4th 
Edition (DSTLR-4), the most comprehensive and well-maintained database of state tort laws 
(Avraham, 2011).    
[Insert Table I.1 here.] 
Furthermore, Figure I.1 presents a box and whisker plot of the growth rate in per capita 
health care expenditures illustrating the variability in state healthcare expenditure growth rates. 
[Insert Figure I.1 here.] 
This paper will use a difference-in-differences model with fixed effects to estimate the 
causal impacts of tort reform laws. In the panel of fifty states we can examine the differences in 
the average growth in personal healthcare spending.  This model with fixed effects will control for 
time and state invariant characteristics.  Therefore, the econometric model that will be estimated 
is  
Yst=β0 + β1Rst + β2Xst + cs + vt + εst 
where Yst is the year over year percentage change in personal healthcare expenditures, Rst= 1 if the 
state, s, had a specific tort reform law in effect at time t. Therefore, β1 is the difference in 
differences parameter of interest. Further, Xst is a vector of time-varying control variables.
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 Following the model estimated in Cuckler and Sisko (2013), the variables included in the 
estimation are the percentage change in the proportion of the state's population that is uninsured, 
the percentage in per capita community hospital beds in a state, the percentage change in the 
African-American, female and over age 65 proportions of the populations, the percentage change 
in real income and the percentage change in the "bad health index". The bad health index was 
created to follow the index in Cuckler and Sisko (2013) and is defined as the product of the 
proportion of the population that smokes and the proportion of the population that is obese for a 
given state. Lastly, cs and vt are state fixed effects and time fixed effects respectively.  Standard 
errors have been clustered by state. 
I.III.  Results 
The basic results are shown in Table I.2.  First, as a state becomes more African American, 
health expenditure growth decreases. Second, as real income grows, the growth in health care 
spending also increases. Additionally, this evidence also shows that the impacts of JSL reform are 
large, reducing aggregated personal healthcare expenditures by .477 percentage points.  However, 
several different types of liability reform are captured by measuring the effects of JSL reforms. An 
outstanding question is whether different types of liability reform have differential impacts across 
healthcare spending. Evaluating the different impacts of different types of liability reforms is the 
primary contribution of this paper to the existing literature. 
[Insert Table I.2 here.] 
The different types of liability reform are joint liability bans (Ban), limiting joint liability 
to situations where the responsible defendants acted in concert (Concert), limiting joint liability to 
situations where the responsible defendants acted with intent (Intent), limiting joint liability to 
situations where the defendant is responsible for at least 50% liability (Fifty), where the plaintiff 
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is blameless (Blameless), where the defendant bears more responsibility than the plaintiff 
(Greater), and a synthetic variable that accounts for any situation where the defendant bears more 
responsibility than the plaintiff (Any).  The Any variable includes any state with either a greater 
liability standard, fifty percent liability, or blameless plaintiff joint liability rules. These 
independent variables are listed in the first column of tables I.3 through I.5. 
The dependent variables are listed in the top row of tables I.3-I.5. These dependent 
variables are different types of healthcare spending growth. The first category is growth in 
aggregated healthcare expenditure, which spending on hospital care, home health care, nursing 
home care, physician and professional office visits, prescription medications, dental care and 
durable medical equipment. The next four categories are specific types of healthcare spending--
growth in expenditures for hospital care, home health care, nursing home care and professional 
services, such as doctor visits. Additionally, in the following tables each cell contains an estimate 
and robust standard error for separate regressions. 
The next set of results are presented in Table I.3. Using disaggregated spending growth, 
the analysis can help determine if specific JSL reforms has a statistically significant impact on 
different sources of healthcare expenditure growth. While all forms of personal spending growth 
are negatively correlated by JSL reform, only aggregate spending growth and physician and 
professional services are significantly affected by any JSL reform when all types of JSL reforms 
are combined. 
[Insert Table I.3 here.] 
There are meaningful differences in the effects of different forms of JSL reforms.  For 
example, joint liability bans are never associated with statistically significant decreases in spending 
growth. Limiting joint liability to defendants who acted in concert and defendants who act 
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intentionally have both positive and negative statistically significant effects on different forms of 
healthcare spending growth. Reforms limiting joint liability to cases of intentional torts lead to a 
1.1 percentage point increase in the growth rate for hospital spending, but a negative 2.2 percentage 
point decrease in the growth rate for physician spending. Acts in concert reforms are associated 
with a 5.3 percentage point increase in home health care spending growth and a 1.2 percentage 
point drop in the growth in nursing home spending. Similarly, reforms limiting joint liability to 
defendants who are at least fifty percent liable is associated with a 3.4 percentage point increase 
in the growth rate of home healthcare spending and a 1.2 percentage point decrease in nursing 
home expenditure growth. Also, the synthetic variable for any type of JSL reform that limits the 
application of joint liability to cases where the defendants are at least as liable as the plaintiff is 
associated with a 1 and 1.8 percentage point decrease in aggregate spending growth and nursing 
home spending growth respectively. 
More importantly, the JSL reform that limits joint liability to situations where the plaintiff 
is blameless or defendant bears more blame than the plaintiff have negative statistically and 
economically significant effects on expenditure growth rates for aggregated personal expenditure 
growth, hospital expenditure growth, nursing home expenditure growth, and physician services 
expenditure growth.   Blameless plaintiff reforms are associated with a .4, 2.9 and 1.3 percentage 
point decrease in aggregated, hospital and clinical services spending growth respectively. 
However, blameless reforms are also associated with a 1.2 percentage point increase in hospital 
spending growth. Reforms that are written such that the defendant can be held jointly responsible 
so long as s/he is more liable that the plaintiff are associated with approximately 1.2, 2.1, 2.1 and 
1 percentage point decreases in aggregated health spending, hospital spending, nursing home 
spending and spending on clinical services. 
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 To investigate the whether these results extend to government health insurance programs, 
I also will examine the effects of JSL reform on Medicaid and Medicare expenditure growth rates.  
However, interpreting the impacts on Medicare and Medicaid spending growth may be 
complicated due to the programs' insulation from market forces.   
Table I.4 presents estimates where the dependent variables are limited to Medicare 
expenditure growth rates.  These results are rather similar to the results presented in Table I.3 
above. Again, any type of JSL reform results in lower rates of aggregate spending growth per 
enrollee. Additionally, fair share reforms are again associated with an approximately one 
percentage point decrease in spending growth. However, there are two cases worth particular 
mention. The blameless plaintiff reform is associated with a nearly nine percentage point decrease 
in the growth in home healthcare spending and the reform limiting joint liability to defendants 
bearing more liability than the plaintiff is associated with a nearly three percentage point increase 
in home healthcare spending growth. 
[Insert Table I.4 here.] 
Implementing a ban on joint liability is associated with a 2.2 percentage point decrease in 
aggregate spending growth and a nearly eight percentage point decrease in home healthcare 
spending growth.  Given the difference between the effects of JSL reforms on Medicare enrollee 
spending growth on home healthcare and the effects of JSL reforms on per capita spending growth 
on home healthcare, additional consideration is necessary to fully understand the economic 
mechanisms at work. The different results may be a result of the fact that Medicare patients are 
largely elderly patients or different incentives between private medical arrangements and Medicare 
surrounding home health care.  
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Table I.5 displays the regression coefficients of JSL reforms on various forms of Medicaid 
expenditure growth.  Unlike Medicare expenditure growth in Table I.4, there are few cases where 
JSL reforms have an economically and statistically significant effects.  Any JSL reform, joint 
liability bans, in concert reforms, reforms where the defendant must bear at least 50% 
responsibility and the synthetic variable grouping the 50% reform, and reforms where the 
defendant is more liable than the plaintiff reform have no statistically significant impacts on any 
form of spending growth.  
[Insert Table I.5 here.] 
On the other hand, the intentional tort reform and blameless plaintiff reform alone are 
associated with large decreases in the growth rate. The intentional tort reform is associated with a 
2.7 percentage point decrease in aggregated spending growth and a nearly 11 percentage point 
decrease in the growth rate of spending on physician services. Furthermore, the blameless plaintiff 
reform alone had large and statistically significant impacts on aggregated spending, hospital 
spending, nursing home spending and spending on clinical services. Oddly, however, the 
blameless plaintiff reform is also associated with a nearly 14 percentage point increase in the 
growth rate of spending on home healthcare.  The reason for this result is unclear; however, it may 
be related to the specific nature of the Medicaid program. Further research should investigate 
patterns of home healthcare use in Medicaid programs. 
At this point, it is appropriate to note that Medicaid is a state run program and state-level 
changes to the administration of Medicaid are not accounted for in this analysis. Therefore, the 
large, and sometimes anomalous, effects of JSL reform on Medicaid spending growth rates may 
be related to some third factor that is associated with the states that pass restrictions on joint 
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liability and state control of the structure of Medicaid. Failing to control for this possibility might 
be biasing these estimates in some way. 
I.IV. Different States, Different Reforms? 
 There could be something different about the states that implement different types of joint 
several liability reform laws. It seems possible that states with lower levels of expenditure growth 
could be more likely to enact fair share liability reforms and states with higher levels take a more 
drastic reform, such as banning joint liability outright.  In this case, the effects of fair share reforms 
may not be economically significant, rather an artifact of states with preexisting lower growth 
rates.  
To evaluate this possibility, I created three lead variables for each of the types of reform.3 
Table I.IV presents the estimates for the first three leads for aggregated personal spending growth.  
Generally, instead of seeing a statistically significant decrease in spending growth before the 
implementation of a JSL reform, there were frequently large increases in personal spending 
growth.  This indicates the results above are not capturing an already existing bend in the personal 
cost curve. The exception to this pattern is the one-year lead of the acts in concert reform is 
associated with a 1.2 percentage point decrease in aggregated personal spending growth. 
[Insert Table I.6 here.] 
Tables I.7 and I.8 present the results of similar tests for the impact of the leads to JSL 
reforms to the expenditure growth of Medicare and Medicaid respectively.  For Medicare spending 
growth, we see negative and statistically significant effects of many different reforms, suggesting 
an additional causal variable that may be biasing the results in section I.II above. Furthermore, the 
                                                          
3However, the leads for the blameless and the greater liability variable created too much multicollinearity to yield 
reliable standard errors and are therefore excluded from this analysis. The results only include leads for general JSL 
reforms, JSL bans, reforms focused on intentional and acts in concert, fifty percent liability and the synthetic 
variable that includes reforms where the defendant bears greater liability. 
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leads in the regressions for Medicaid spending growth per enrollee are almost never associated 
with statistically significant effects, positive or negative. One exception, the three-year lead of 
banning joint liability, is associated with a nearly six percentage point decrease in aggregated per 
enrollee Medicaid spending growth.  
[Insert Table I.7 here.] 
[Insert Table I.8 here.] 
I.V.  Placebo Tests. 
 Finally, the above analyses require an assumption about the distribution from which the 
regression coefficients are drawn. However, several researchers have used randomization tests to 
generate a 'true' distribution of the coefficients for inference. Following the work of Helland and 
Tabarrok (2004) and Donohue and Wolfers (2006), I randomly match state-level reforms to state 
levels of growth in healthcare expenditures. Then, I repeatedly estimate the econometric 
specification from above to generate the distribution of coefficients. By using the standard errors 
from this distribution, I can again calculate the t-statistics to reevaluate statistical significance. 
 The first set of placebo regressions were for the growth rate of aggregated personal 
healthcare expenditures.4 JSL reforms were randomly matched to state healthcare expenditure 
growth rates 1000 times to generate placebo standard errors. These standard errors were then used 
to compute new t-statistics and assign statistical significance. The placebo tests supported the 
results presented in section I.III. For individual healthcare spending growth, every coefficient that 
was statistically significant in section I.III was also statistically significant in the placebo tests. 
Moreover, the placebo tests generate statistically significant t-statistics for joint liability bans, acts 
                                                          
4The results of the placebo regressions are included in the Appendix. Table I.A3 presents the results associated with 
aggregated personal spending growth. Table I.A4 presents the results for Medicare spending growth per enrollee and 
Table I.A5 presents the results for Medicaid spending growth per enrollee. 
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in concert and fifty percent reforms. This suggests the standard errors from section III were 
generally too large. 
 The analysis was also run for Medicare and Medicaid per enrollee spending. The placebo 
tests generally confirm the results from section I.III. The Medicare placebo tests find statistical 
significance for every coefficient that was significant in section I.III. The Medicaid placebo tests 
were less clear-cut. The placebo test confirms the statistical significant of the intentional acts 
reform, but fails to confirm the statistical significance of the blameless plaintiff reform. 
Additionally, the placebo test generates a statistical significant t-statistic associated with the 
variable indicated a state had enacted any type of JSL reform. 
I.VI. Discussion & Conclusion 
This paper investigated whether different types of JSL tort reform were associated with 
decreased rates of healthcare spending growth. Previous authors (Avraham 2007; Avraham and 
Schanzenbach 2009; Avraham, Dafny and Schanzenbach 2010; Viscusi and Born 2005; Sloan and 
Shadle 2009) made the inference that decreasing malpractice payments and lower health insurance 
premiums were indicative of lower healthcare expenditures. My analysis shows that when all JSL 
reforms were combined into a single variable, there were significant negative effects on health 
care expenditures. However, this analysis also demonstrates different types of liability reform have 
different effects on healthcare expenditure growth. The JSL reforms based on the proportionality 
of liability have very meaningful and negative effects on the growth rate of physician and clinical 
service costs and the growth rate of hospital costs.  Therefore, decreasing expenditure growth rates 
for clinical services and hospital services is likely to have a meaningful impact for consumers. 
This paper demonstrates a causal relationship between ‘fair share’ reforms and slower 
growth in healthcare costs.  “Fair share” types of reform seem to have significant effects across 
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most forms of expenditure growth rates, while JSL bans, intentional acts and acts in concert 
reforms seem to rarely affect growth rates. Additionally, the effects of “fair share” reforms were 
generally robust to placebo tests. 
While there is evidence in this analysis that Medicaid spending growth can be decreased 
by implementing JSL reforms, the analysis is less robust. This may be a result of any number of 
factors biasing the estimates. Specifically, it is important to note that Medicaid is a state-run 
program and state reforms may have occurred simultaneously with JSL reforms in a manner such 
that the effects of JSL reforms could no longer be identified.  Additional analyses demonstrated 
the complexity of interpreting the effects of different JSL reforms on Medicaid spending.  
Additionally, it is possible the changes in disaggregated categories of medical spending 
may not represent actual decreases in the medical spending growth, but shifts among the categories 
of spending.  This seems unlikely for total personal medical spending growth, as any types of 
spending growth were negatively affected by JSL reforms.  However, this subject is much less 
clear for disaggregated categories of Medicaid spending growth.  In some instances, the effect of 
JSL reform on personal, Medicare and Medicaid spending growth was positive and in some 
instances, the effect of JSL reform was negative. This could imply shifts between categories of 
spending, such as away from nursing home spending and toward home healthcare spending. 
Furthermore, shifts in spending could be a result of an unknown third factor. 
Further research should investigate why JSL reforms seem to have different effects across 
per capita spending and government spending growth rates and different effects across different 
types of spending.  This work suggests government healthcare spending growth must be addressed 
through policies other than joint several liability reform.  Additionally, explaining why some 
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segments of medical spending growth are affected by tort reform and some are not may offer 
important insights into the mechanisms of healthcare spending and healthcare charges. 











 After the passage of the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act, hospitals 
who accept Medicare payments must also provide medical screening to any individual who 
requests and any emergent conditions must be stabilized, without regard to the patient’s ability to 
pay or insurance status. This has resulted in emergency departments being used as insurers of last 
resort for patients without insurance. The intent of the law is to prevent hospitals from ‘dumping’ 
patients because of high anticipated treatment costs. This law may seem to imply that all patients 
reporting to the emergency room with similar conditions would experience similar treatment, 
regardless of insurance status. However, it is not clear whether emergency department patients 
are treated the same in emergency departments and whether differences in treatment patterns 
lead to differences in short term health outcomes. 
Healthcare researchers have investigated differences in healthcare and mortality patterns 
across patients by insurance status; however, they face great difficulty in identifying causal 
relationships between insurance status and outcomes. Healthcare and treatment outcomes are 
influenced by a large number of unobserved and endogenous variables. Therefore, identifying 
the relationship between health insurance and health outcomes has been rather difficult. This 
paper uses a nationwide data set to answer three questions:  (1) Do the results in Doyle’s (2005) 
study of Wisconsin motor vehicle accident injuries hold for a nationwide sample; (2) Are the 
effects of health insurance on outcomes of motor vehicle accident injuries generalizable to other 
types of injuries; (3) Are the results in Doyle robust to overall health status?  
Overall, I find Doyle’s results are confirmed in a nationwide survey of motor vehicle 
accident injuries. Additionally, Doyle’s findings are robust when controls for overall health 
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status apart from injury. Lastly, the effects of health insurance status on the outcomes of injuries 
not resulting from motor vehicle accidents are smaller in magnitude than the effects of health 
insurance status on motor vehicle accident injuries.  
II.II Literature Review 
According to Hadley's 2003 review of the literature, a quarter century of research about 
the relationship between insurance status, health status and health outcomes has involved dozens 
of studies. These studies have evaluated different diseases, different measures of care and 
outcomes, used different data sets and different methodologies. These results largely demonstrate 
individuals without insurance access less healthcare, but have a difficultly reaching conclusions 
about the causal relationship between receiving less healthcare and differences in health 
outcomes.  
Unfortunately for researchers, the decision to purchase health insurance and the decision 
to seek medical treatment are generally considered to be endogenously determined with health 
outcomes. These identification challenges have made it difficult to confidently interpret the 
relationship between insurance status and healthcare outcomes. If healthy individuals are more 
likely to purchase health insurance and individuals with health insurance are more likely to seek 
medical treatment, then the outcome of treatment may appear to be related insurance status as a 
result of omitted variable bias. As a result, health researchers have used a number of creative and 
unusual methods to measure the relationship between insurance status and treatment outcomes. 
For example, Braveman et al. (1994) investigates the likelihood that appendicitis 
progresses to a ruptured appendix as a function of insurance status. Braverman et al. (1994) 
assumes the risk of a ruptured appendix is approximately randomly assigned across individuals 
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and assigned independently from individual insurance status, the probability of a ruptured 
appendix is a good measure of access to care and treatment quality. If these assumptions hold 
and each individual is treated the same way, there should not be statistically significant 
differences among the probability of appendicle rupture across different types of insurance.  
However, using a California sample, Braveman et al. (1994) find uninsured patients and 
Medicaid patients are more likely to suffer from appendicle rupture than patients with private 
insurance. 
 More recently, studying patterns of care, costs and mortality rates for heart attack, stroke 
and pneumonia patients, Hasan, Orav and Hicks (2010) document that privately insured patients 
have mortality rates that were statistically significantly lower than uninsured and Medicaid 
patients (N=154,381). These results were robust to age and sex standardization, comorbidity 
controls and disease severity. Furthermore, patients with private insurance were associated with 
higher costs and higher resource demands, despite having shorter stays in the hospital than 
uninsured individuals.   
However, several researchers have argued research about heart attack, pneumonia and 
similar conditions may be biased due to the complicated relationship between the factors that 
influence insurance choices and influence healthcare outcomes. As a result, researchers have 
attempted to correct for this bias by investigating the impacts of insurance status on trauma care 
and outcomes of trauma treatment by assuming that traumatic injuries are uncorrelated with 
health insurance status. In other words, researchers understand injuries as shocks to health status 
and randomly distributed across patients, regardless of the patient’s insurance status. For 
example, Haas and Goldman (1994) created a sample of Massachusetts adult acute trauma 
patients (N=15,008) from emergency department patients to evaluate the impact of payer status 
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on difference in care and mortality rates.  Uninsured patients with acute trauma were more likely 
to die, less likely to receive surgical care or physical therapy, and equally likely to be admitted to 
the intensive care unit compared to patients with private insurance. Medicaid patients were also 
less likely to receive surgical care but were no less likely to receive care in the intensive care unit 
or receive physical therapy and were no more likely to die. 
 Furthermore, Xiang et al. (2014) uses the 2010 NEDS to investigate the probability a 
severely injured individual is undertriaged (N=232,448). Undertriaged refers to situations where 
a patient’s injuries are judged and treated as less severe than they really are. To do this, the 
authors restrict the sample to patients with an injury severity score greater than 16 for whom 
definitive emergency department care is observed. While 34% of the sample is undertriaged, 
Xiang finds no evidence the odds of undertriage increase for patients who are uninsured, 
receiving compensated care or have Medicaid coverage relative to individuals with private 
insurance. However, they do find probability of undertriage increases for individuals with 
Medicare coverage. Furthermore, it is unclear whether the probability of undertriage has any 
impact on the probability of mortality or the quality of care. 
Lastly, Doyle (2005) uses severe car accidents in Wisconsin (N=10,842) as a health 
shocks to investigate the quality of treatment and health outcomes as a function of health 
insurance. This approach has the benefit of eliminating the selection bias associated with the 
decision to purchase health insurance and bias associated with the choice to go to the emergency 
department as ambulances are a routine member of the crash investigation team. Nevertheless, 
Doyle still demonstrates being uninsured has an impact on care and treatment outcomes. Doyle 
reports the uninsured receive 20% less treatment and have a mortality rate that is 1.5 percentage 
points higher than individuals with private insurance. 
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While Doyle’s paper attempted to correct the bias associated with the endogeneity of 
having health insurance, it has some significant shortcomings. First, Doyle’s paper uses a data 
set from a single state and it is not clear whether the results are generalizable to the national 
healthcare system. Second, Doyle investigates only motor vehicle accident injuries that were 
investigated by officials. While this decision does eliminate the individual’s choice to present to 
the emergency department, it does strictly limit the generalizability of his results. Furthermore, 
injuries associated with motor vehicle accidents are primarily insured through automobile 
insurance and the results may not be an accurate measurement of the relationship between health 
insurance status and healthcare outcomes and patterns since those without health insurance could 
be covered by auto insurance. Lastly, Doyle has no method to control for the severity of 
underlying health conditions which may impact any patient’s response to treatment and may 
impact the probability a patient has health insurance. 
The current research builds on the Doyle’s research by broadening the analysis to a 
national sample and considering other types of injuries. Additionally, using hospital 
administration records, I am able to explicitly control for health status using the Charleston 
comorbidity index (Charlson et al. 1987, Deyo et al. 1992, Quan et al. 2005). Lastly, this 
research compares the differences in treatment outcomes within the group of individuals 
characterized as uninsured by separating individuals who are uninsured but receiving charity care 
from uninsured individuals who are expected to pay out of pocket. 
II.III Methodology 
 The samples were drawn from the 2006-2011 Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project's 
Nationwide Emergency Department Sample. The first sample contains individuals over age 18 
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who were presented to the emergency department with an injury diagnosis coded as a motor 
vehicle accident. The second sample contains individuals over 18 who presented to the 
emergency department with a primary injury diagnosis, excluding those with an external injury 
code associated with a motor vehicle accident or terrorism. Each sample was also restricted to 
individuals with an injury severity score greater than five as an attempt to limit the examination 
to injuries which required medical attention. Additionally, each sample was limited to 
individuals with private health insurance, Medicare insurance, Medicaid insurance or were 
uninsured. Patients who reported other insurance, such as CHAMPVA, were categorized as 
“other.” The diversity of payers included in the “other” variable would not allow for clear 
conclusions about the coefficient on this variable. Therefore, these patients were omitted from 
the current study. Uninsured patients could be further characterized as those who received 
charity care and those who did not. 
 The independent variables of interest were the dummy variables for payer status--private 
payer, Medicare, Medicaid, self-insurance or charity care. Additional control variables included 
in the regression were whether the hospital was a rural hospital, gender, age, year, and the 
median income for the patient's zip code. Age is a continuous variable from 18 to 100. The year 
variables were coded as dummy variables for 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2006 was 
used as the reference year. Median income categories were bracket one, from $1-38,999, bracket 
two from $39,000-47,999, bracket three from $48,000-63,999, and bracket 4 for income above 
$64,000 in 2011 dollars. The income category for above $64,000 was used as the reference 
category. Table II.1 presents descriptive statistics for the sample grouped by injury cause. 
I also include variables to measure the severity of the injury and the overall health of the 
patient. First, to measure the overall health of the patient, I calculate the Charlson comorbidity 
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index.5 The Charlson index is a measure of the ten year mortality probabilities developed by 
Charlson et al. (1987) and extended to newer coding systems by Deyo et al. (1992) and Quan 
(2005). The Charlson index assigns values from zero to six for seventeen different diagnosis 
codes and weights these values according to their mortality risk. The weighted values are then 
summed to create a single number measuring mortality risk. This was accomplished using the 
Charlson macro in STATA (Stagg 2015).6 
Additionally, to measure the severity of the injury, I calculated the Injury Severity Score 
using STATA's ICDPIC program (Clark, Osler, & Hahn 2010). The Injury Severity Score is 
determined by assigning each injury an Abbreviated Injury Scale Score and a region of the body. 
Then the three most severely injured body regions and injuries are squared and summed to create 
the ISS. The ISS ranges from zero to seventy five. An ISS of seventy five is assigned to 
unsurvivable injuries. The descriptive statistics for the Charlson Index and the Injury Severity 
Score are presented in Table II.1. 
 The dependent variables included in the primary analyses were the probability of dying in 
the emergency room and the probability the patient was admitted to the hospital as an inpatient. 
Additionally, treatment intensity is measured by the number of procedures performed in the 
emergency department, number of procedures performed during the inpatient stay and the length 
of stay as an inpatient. Summary statistics for the dependent variables are presented in Table II.1 
as well. Figures II.1-II.3 display the averages in dependent variables across payer groups. 
                                                          
5 A similar measure, the Elixhauser comorbidity score was alternatively used to measure comorbidity. The results 
were unaffected. 
6 Charlson index values were calculated using both the Stagg, 2015 measure and the macro included in the ICDPIC 
program (Clark, Osler, & Hahn 2010). The results were unchanged. 
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 Column six of Table II.1 presents the differences in the means between motor vehicle 
accident patients and patients with other types of injuries as well as indicating the statistical 
significance of these differences. However, it is important to note the sample is quite large and 
statistically significant differences may not be indicative of economically significant differences. 
That being said, there are some differences between the samples that are both statistically and 
economically significant. For example, motor vehicle accident injury patients are nearly twenty 
years younger than patients with another type of injury. Furthermore, there is a nearly forty 
percentage point difference in the probability of having private insurance between motor vehicle 
patients and patients with other types of injuries. At the same time, other injury patients are forty 
percentage points more likely to have Medicare. Lastly, before controlling for health condition or 
insurance status, patients with motor vehicle accident injuries are more likely to die in the 
emergency room, more likely to be admitted, undergo more procedures in the emergency 
department and the inpatient ward and experience longer stays as inpatients. 
II.IV Estimates of the Effect of Payer Status on Emergency Room Disposition 
For the analysis of outcome and disposition patterns, I use a logit regression. The 
specification is as follows: 
Yi= αi + β1Medicarei + β2Medicaidi + β3Self-payi + β4Charityi + β5Xi + β3T + εi  (1) 
where Yi is measures the probability of dying in the ED, probability of dying after admission, 
probability of being admitted and the probability of leaving the hospital against medical advice 
for record i. Additionally, private insurancei, Medicaidi, Medicarei, self-payingi, and charityi 
variables are dummy variables for the respective primary payer for record i.  Private insurance is 
the reference variable. Xi is a vector of the control variables for observation i. As is traditional, εi 
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is the error term. Furthermore, standard errors and confidence intervals were adjusted to correct 
for hospital specific errors by clustering on the hospital.  As the variables for the number of 
procedures and length of stay are continuous, an ordinary least squares specification was used for 
those outcomes employing the same independent variables in equation (1).  
Table II.2 presents estimates of the marginal effects of insurance status on the outcome 
and disposition variables for patients presenting with an injury as a result of a motor vehicle 
accident and other injury results. The results in Table II.2, as well as all of the results in this 
section control for age, income category, gender, the Charlson comorbidity index, year, rural 
hospital, rural patient status, large urban area hospital and whether the hospital is a teaching 
hospital. Some results were expected. For example, Medicare patients are more likely to die in 
the emergency room and more likely to die after admission. Additionally, Medicare patients are 
more likely to be admitted to the hospital as an inpatient and more likely to leave against medical 
advice. Medicaid patient are also more likely to be admitted to the hospital patients and more 
likely to die after admission than privately insured.  
However, some results indicate differences in outcomes that were not expected a priori. 
First, uninsured patients receiving charity care are not significantly different from privately 
insured patients with respect to death rates in the emergency department and the rate of 
admission. However, uninsured patients who do not receive charity care and therefore are paying 
out-of-pocket for healthcare costs are more likely to die in the emergency department, more 
likely to leave against medical advice and nearly nice percentage points less likely to be admitted 
to the hospital than privately insured patients. 
 Results for patients presenting with an injury not caused by a motor vehicle accident are 
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also shown below in Table II.2. Only self-paying patients are more likely to die in the emergency 
room than privately insured patients. Additionally, patients insured by Medicare, Medicaid and 
patients who are paying out of pocket are more likely to die after admission to the hospital. 
Medicare, Medicaid and charity patients are more likely to be admitted to the hospital; however, 
self-paying patients are again significantly less likely to be admitted to the hospital. Lastly, 
Medicaid patients, charity patients and self-paying patients are more likely to leave against 
medical advice relative to privately insured patients.  
 Furthermore, there are differential effects of insurance status on the probability of 
admission to the hospital. These results are presented in Table II.3. For motor vehicle injuries, 
Medicare and Medicaid patients are more than five percentage points more likely to be admitted 
to the hospital and patients paying out of pocket were nearly nine percentage points less likely to 
be admitted to the hospital relative to privately insured patients. However, there was no 
significant difference in the likelihood a privately insured patient and a patient receiving charity 
care were admitted after a motor vehicle accident. 
 When examining motor vehicle accident patients and patients with other types of injuries, 
there are some similarities. Medicare and Medicaid patients are still more likely to be admitted 
after suffering other types of injuries than privately insured patients. For patients paying out of 
pocket, the difference with privately insured patients has decreased, from nearly nine percentage 
points for motor vehicle injuries to being approximately 3.5 percentage points less likely to be 
admitted after other types of injuries. The largest difference between patients with motor vehicle 
accident injury and other types of injuries is the difference in admission probabilities for patients 
receiving charity care. While there was no statistically significant difference in admission 
probability for privately insured and charity care patients after motor vehicle accidents, charity 
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care patients with injuries from other causes are over 15 percentage points more likely to be 
admitted to the hospital than privately insured patients.  
II.V Effects of Insurance Status on Treatment Patterns 
 Table II.4 compares the treatment patterns for patients who begin their visit through the 
emergency room with different primary payers. For motor vehicle injury patients, self-paying 
patients have a slightly shorter inpatient stay and receive fewer inpatient procedures. 
Unsurprisingly, Medicare patients have longer hospital stays than privately insured patients. It 
also seems reasonable that charity patients receive more procedures in the emergency department 
and fewer procedures after being admitted to the hospital. Lastly, Medicaid patients receive 
fewer emergency department procedures, stay in the hospital longer and receive a higher number 
of inpatient procedures than their privately insured counterparts. 
 Also in Table II.4, the results of the treatment pattern analysis for patients whose injury 
was not coded as being caused by a motor vehicle are shown. Again, Medicare patients tend to 
have longer inpatient stays, as do Medicaid patients, than privately insured counterparts. 
Medicaid patients tend to receive fewer procedures in the emergency department, but 
significantly more procedures as an inpatient. Also, as for motor vehicle accident injury patients, 
self-paying patients stayed in the hospital for less time and received fewer inpatient procedures 
that similar patients with private insurance.  
II.VI Effects of Insurance Status on Patients over Age 65. 
 Due to the near universal coverage of individuals over the age of 65 and the significant 
difference in the average age for motor vehicle injury patients and patients with other types of 
injuries, I also analyze the effects of insurance status on injury treatment for patients under age 
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65. Table II.5 presents the descriptive statistics for motor vehicle accident and other injury 
patients and examines the statistical significance of the differences between the groups. As with 
the full sample, many of the differences between the two groups are statistically significant, but 
the differences are also somewhat smaller than for the full sample.  
 For individuals over the age of 65 with motor vehicle accident injury, self-paying patients 
are nearly one half a percentage point more likely to die in the emergency departments than 
privately insured patients as shown in Table II.6. Additionally, Medicaid patients were .08 
percentage points less likely to die in the emergency department and there was no significant 
difference between the probability that privately insured and charity care patients died in the 
emergency room.  
 Also, in the case of injuries from causes other than motor vehicle accidents, there was no 
significant differences in the probability of death in the emergency department among privately 
insured patients, Medicare patients, Medicaid patients and patients receiving charity care. There 
was, however, an increased probability that uninsured patients paying out of pocket would die in 
the emergency department with respect to privately insured individuals. 
 Moreover, admission probabilities still vary by insurance status for patients under the age 
of 65. The marginal effects of insurance status on admission probabilities are presented in Table 
II.7. Regardless of the cause of injury, Medicaid and charity care patients are more likely to be 
admitted than privately insured patients.  Uninsured patients expected to pay out of pocket are 
less likely to be admitted than privately insured patients. For injuries caused by motor vehicle 
injuries, there is no difference in the admission probability between Medicare patients and 
privately insured patients. On the other hand, for other types of injuries, Medicare patients are 
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over two percentage points more likely to be admitted than privately insured patients. 
 With respect to treatment patterns, Medicare patients with motor vehicle accident injures 
underwent more procedures in the emergency department, as did patients receiving charity care. 
These results are presented in Table II.8. Medicaid patients received fewer procedures in the 
emergency room, but underwent more procedures as inpatients and once admitted had longer 
inpatient stays than privately insured patients. However, similar patients paying out of pocket 
had shorter inpatient stays and underwent fewer inpatient procedures than privately insured 
patients. Patients receiving charity care also underwent fewer inpatient procedures, despite 
having longer inpatient stays than privately insured patients. 
 Patients with injuries resulting from causes other than motor vehicle accidents also 
demonstrate patterns of treatment that vary in a statistically significant manner with respect to 
insurance status. Medicare patients under 65 undergo more emergency department procedures 
and Medicaid patients undergo fewer procedures in the emergency department than do privately 
insured patients. The number of emergency department procedures performed for charity patients 
and patients paying out of pocket was not different from privately insured patients in a 
statistically significant manner. As with motor vehicle accident injuries, patients paying out of 
pocket had shorter inpatient stays than privately insured patients and Medicare and Medicaid 
patients had longer inpatient stays. Lastly, Medicare patients underwent fewer inpatient 





 These analyses add to the literature on payer status and emergency room treatment. The 
motor vehicle accident injury patients demonstrate patterns consistent with Doyle's earlier work. 
As Doyle found, uninsured patients are more likely to die in the emergency department, less 
likely to be admitted after a motor vehicle injury and spend less time in the hospital. 
Furthermore, the results from analyzing outcome and treatment patterns for patients with injuries 
from other causes also support this conclusion; however, the causes of traumatic injury vary 
across patients. 
 The predicted probability that privately insured patients with motor vehicle accident 
injuries die in the emergency department is .7% but uninsured patients have a 1.3% predicted 
probability dying in the emergency department, despite controlling for overall health and injury 
severity. However, for patients with injuries from other causes, the predicted probability that 
privately insured patients .2% of privately insured patients die in the emergency department 
while the predicted probability that uninsured patients die in the emergency department is .7%. 
Therefore, motor vehicle injury patients without any form of insurance are approximately twice 
as likely to die as similar patients with private health insurance. Patients with other types of 
injuries are over three times more likely to die in the emergency department if they are uninsured 
than patients with private insurance.  
 Furthermore, the additional probability of death in the emergency department for 
uninsured patients is not offset by an increase in the probability of death after admission for 
patients with private insurance. In other words, it is not the case that patients with private 
insurance are using more medical services, but end up experiencing similar outcomes. Instead, 
uninsured patients are more likely to die following both motor vehicle accidents and other types 
of injuries.  
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 Differences between Charity Care and Self Paying Patients 
 This paper presents new results that indicate a need for further research beyond 
supporting Doyle’s (2005) findings. First, among these are the results for patients receiving 
charity care from the hospital. This analysis demonstrates that although patients who are 
uninsured and pay out of pocket and patients who are uninsured but receive charity care 
experience different patterns of treatment and experience different patterns of outcomes. Patients 
receiving charity care are more likely to be admitted to the hospital than privately insured 
patients when the injury is not the result of a motor vehicle accident. However, for other 
measures of treatment and outcome, charity care patients receive similar treatment and have 
similar outcomes as do privately insured patients, regardless of the mechanism of injury. 
 Table II.9 presents the descriptive statistics comparing patients paying out of pocket and 
patients receiving charity care for both motor vehicle accident injuries and injuries from other 
causes. There are statistically significant differences between patients paying out of pocket and 
patients receiving charity care. For example, there are significant differences in the Charlson 
comorbidity scores, injury severity score and the proportion in the highest income group and the 
lowest income group. Patients paying out of pocket have slightly lower comorbidity scores and 
slightly lower injury severity scores regardless of whether the patient has been injured in a motor 
vehicle accident or has been injured in some other way. These patients are also more likely to be 
in the highest income group and are less likely to fall into the lowest income group. Lastly, 
patients paying out of pocket are more likely to be patients from a rural area and more likely to 
attend a rural hospital. 
37 
 
 Furthermore, Table II.10 presents estimation results when the samples are limited to only 
patients receiving charity care and patients paying out of pocket. While there are no statistically 
differences in the probability of dying in the emergency department, patients paying out of 
pocket are significantly less likely to be admitted, spend fewer days as inpatients and receive 
fewer inpatient procedures relative to patients receiving charity care. Paying out of pocket is 
associated with a 21 percentage point decrease in the probability a patient with injuries from a 
motor vehicle accident is admitted to the hospital despite controlling for comorbidity and injury 
severity. For patients with injuries from causes other than motor vehicle accidents, they are 11 
percentage points less likely to be admitted. As well as differences in admission rates associated 
with paying out of pocket. Patients paying out of pocket who were admitted with injuries form 
motor vehicle accidents had inpatient stays that were, on average, over two days shorter than 
uninsured patients receiving charity care. 
  Additionally, the results comparing Medicaid patients to privately insured patients raise 
further questions for research. Medicaid patients receive fewer procedures in the emergency 
department than privately insured patients, but are more likely to be admitted to the hospital, 
spend more time in the hospital after being admitted, and receive more inpatient procedures than 
privately insured patients.  The differences between Medicaid patients and privately insured 
patients may be related to the differences in Medicaid reimbursement rates. However, because 
the current data set is nationwide and does not control for state, this study is insufficient to 
examine the causal mechanism for different types of treatment for Medicaid patients. Further 
research should examine whether the Medicaid results are driven by state level Medicaid policies 
or some other factor. 
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 Unlike Doyle, this paper explicitly controls for health status and injury severity. Doyle 
attempts to solve both problems by assuming motor vehicle accident injuries are assigned 
independently of health insurance decisions and independently from the decision to seek medical 
attention. Doyle uses ambulance arrival or patient incapacitation to measure injury severity. 
However, this paper also assumes injuries are assigned randomly with respect to health insurance 
status, but also includes established controls for health status and injury severity.   
 Furthermore, this paper includes additional dependent variables to measure the treatment 
and outcome patterns. Doyle focuses on mortality, length of stay in the hospital and hospital 
charges. This paper uses two measures of mortality, mortality in the emergency department and 
mortality after admission to the hospital. Additionally, this paper uses length of stay, number of 
procedures performed in the emergency department and the number of procedures performed 
after admission to investigate the relationship between health insurance status and treatment 
patterns. 
 This paper extends and supports Doyle's conclusion that being uninsured is associated 
with less care and higher death rates resulting from motor vehicle injuries and other types of 
injuries. Uninsured patients are less likely to be admitted to the hospital and, once admitted, 
spend less time in the hospital and receive fewer procedures once they have been admitted. 
Furthermore, this paper also suggests there are other effects of insurance status and additional 
research to be undertaken. Uninsured patients receiving charity care do not have statistically 
significant mortality trends or statistically different patterns of treatment than privately insured 
patients. Lastly, Medicaid patients are admitted at higher rates than privately insured patients and 
appear to receive less treatment in the emergency department and more treatment as an inpatient 
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“THE IMPACT OF HEALTH INSURANCE ON HEALTH ATTACK OUTCOMES.” 





After the passage of the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act, hospitals 
who accept Medicare payments must also provide medical screening to any individual who 
requests and stabilize any emergent conditions, without regard to the patient’s ability to pay or 
insurance status. This law may seem to imply that all patients reporting to the emergency room 
with similar conditions would experience similar treatment, regardless of insurance status. 
However, it is not clear whether emergency department patients are treated the same in 
emergency departments and whether differences in treatment patterns lead to differences in short 
term health outcomes. 
Healthcare researchers have investigated differences in healthcare and mortality patterns 
across patients by insurance status; however, they face great difficulty in identifying causal 
relationships between insurance status and outcomes. Healthcare, insurance status, and treatment 
outcomes are influenced by a large number of unobserved and endogenous variables. Health 
status likely indicates both the outcome of medical treatment and the decision to purchase health 
insurance. Whether an individual has insurance may also influence the decision to seek treatment 
and insurance may actually influence health status. These issues create several opportunities for 
endogeneity and make identifying the relationship between health insurance and health outcomes 
has been rather difficult. Taking advantage of increasingly large datasets and improvements in 
computing power, researchers have recently been able to do a more rigorous examination of the 
effect of health insurance on health outcomes. 
III.II Literature Review 
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 This paper contributes to the literature examining the relationship between a patient’s 
medical condition and a patient’s treatment. Health economists and epidemiologists have long 
been interested in the factors other than the patient’s medical condition that influence treatment. 
For example, why do some patients get treatment in line with professional guidelines and some 
do not? Tsai et al. (2010) specifically investigate the degree to which acute myocardial infarction 
(AMI) patients in emergency departments receive treatment congruent with the American 
Council of Cardiology guidelines. They conclude there is only a low-to-moderate degree of 
compliance with such guidelines.  
 Health economists have investigated the relationship between physician characteristics, 
hospital characteristics, and financial incentives, and treatment decisions and patient outcomes. 
Obviously, these questions are quite difficult to analyze because of the number of unobservable 
and relevant variables and the challenge associated with satisfactorily identifying causal 
relationships. However, these challenges have not stopped research. 
 Early economic evaluation of treatment patterns with investigations of the decision to 
perform cesarean section delivery instead of vaginal delivery. These researchers could take 
advantage of timing, assuming time of delivery is distributed independently of the medical 
conditions of labor. This research is summarized in Keeler & Brodie (1993) who examine 
literature investigating the physician, hospital, insurer and maternal preferences influence the 
probability of cesarean delivery. 
 Later research, such as Gruber, Kim, and Mayzlin (1999) and Grant (2009), take 
advantage of changes in the Medicaid reimbursement rates between cesarean sections and 
vaginal deliveries as exogenous shocks. The medical condition of patients should not have 
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changed after the new rates, but new rates may induce the rate of cesarean section to change. 
Gruber, Kim and Mayzlin (1999) argue decreases in Medicaid reimbursement rates for cesarean 
births lead to fewer cesarean births. Grant (2009) replicates this work and also finds an effect, 
though smaller than Gruber, Kim, and Mayzlin, of reimbursement rates on treatment patterns.  
 Certainly, investigators would like to be able to investigate conditions other than labor 
and delivery. However, this does require either additional data, different identification strategies, 
or strong assumptions about the distribution of underlying health status. Some investigators, for 
example, Doyle (2005), address this limitation by considering only accident injury patients 
arriving at the emergency department by ambulance. Unfortunately, this research also finds 
controlling for the underlying patient condition or the severity of the patient’s injury impossible 
given the particular data set. 
Alternatively Braveman et al. (1994) investigates the likelihood that appendicitis 
progresses to a ruptured appendix as a function of insurance status. Braverman et al. (1994) 
assumes the risk of a ruptured appendix is approximately randomly assigned across individuals 
and assigned independently from individual insurance status, the probability of a ruptured 
appendix in the emergency department is a good measure of access to care and treatment quality. 
If these assumptions hold and each individual is treated the same way, there should not be 
statistically significant differences among the probability of appendicle rupture across different 
types of insurance.  However, using a California sample, Braveman et al. (1994) find uninsured 
patients and Medicaid patients are more likely to suffer from appendicle rupture than patients 
with private insurance. However, it is possible insurance status affects individual’s willingness to 




 More recently, studying patterns of care, costs and mortality rates for heart attack, stroke 
and pneumonia patients, Hasan, Orav and Hicks (2010) document that privately insured patients 
have mortality rates that were statistically significantly lower than uninsured and Medicaid 
patients (N=154,381). These results were robust to age and sex standardization, comorbidity 
controls and disease severity. Furthermore, patients with private insurance were associated with 
higher costs and higher resource demands, despite having shorter stays in the hospital than 
uninsured individuals.   
Pezzin et al. (2007) also considers insurance status when investigating whether patients 
presenting with chest pain in the emergency department differ with respect the race and gender. 
However, this research uses only four diagnostic criteria to evaluate the appropriateness of 
treatment, strictly limiting the causal interpretation of this research.  
Other medical and economic literature investigates the differences in treatment for 
patients with HMO insurance as opposed to fee-for-service insurance. For example Gaynor, 
Rebitzer, and Taylor (2004) consider the behavior of physicians in HMO programs in response 
to a new incentive structure at a specific HMO. They also show there is a statistically significant 
effect between financial incentives and the provision of services, but again are unable to observe 
individual patient treatment or the clinical nature of specific physician groups. Seddon et al. 
(2001) also focus on the differences between HMO and FFS insurance, but are limited in their 
causal interpretation. 
 As data sets became more complete and computing power decreased in costs, researchers 
have gained access to large, administrative datasets that include medical coding information for 
comorbidities, diagnoses, and specific procedure use. Several researchers have used the 
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additional data to construct propensity scores or indexes for patient condition. For example, Sada 
et al. (1998) uses the National Registry of Myocardial Infarction to construct a measure of 
appropriateness for intensive treatment and compares treatment and outcome patterns across FFS 
insurance, HMO insurance, Medicaid and uninsured patients. They demonstrate Medicaid 
patients have higher in-hospital mortality. Further, the likelihood of receiving angiography is 
significantly lower in HMO, Medicaid and uninsured patients. However, hospitals self-select into 
participation into the National Registry of Myocardial Infarction, suggesting the results may not 
represent average practice. 
Currie, MacLeod and Van Parys (CMV) bring the use of patient appropriateness for 
intensive treatment to the health economics literature (2016). CMV uses a simple, but robust, 
measure of patient appropriateness for surgical treatment to investigate provider temperament 
and patient outcomes. While not addressing the relationship between insurance status and patient 
treatment, CMV’s methodology is a significant step in being able to use administrative data sets 
and investigate patient treatment. 
Here, I take advantage of the methodology developed in CMV to investigate the effects 
of insurance status on patient treatment and emergency department disposition. Despite the 
breadth of the existing literature, to my knowledge, this is the first paper to investigate the 
relationship between insurance status and the treatment patterns of acute myocardial infarctions 
in emergency departments after controlling for underlying health status. 




 The data is collected from the 2006-2011 Nationwide Emergency Department Sample 
from the Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project. The sample is limited to patients entering the 
emergency department with a primary diagnosis of an acute myocardial infarction, or heart 
attack, whose expected payer is private insurance, Medicare, Medicaid, paying out of pocket and 
who are not expected to be charged. Patients who had a primary payer of other, such as 
CHAMVA, were excluded from the sample. The diversity of payers included in the “other” 
variable would not allow for clear conclusions about the coefficient on this variable. Therefore, 
these patients were omitted from the current study. Uninsured patients could be further 
characterized as those who received charity care and those who did not. 
 It is important to understand what payer status means in the HCUP NEDS data sets. The 
HCUP NEDS is a data set collected from individual states that collect various types of 
information from hospitals using the national claims standard, known as the Uniform Bill (UB). 
The UB does not include an element for payer; thus, states have developed different 
classification processes to respond to the HCUP element “expected payer.” Therefore, “expected 
payer” can be best understood as the entity that the hospital expects to pay for a service. 
“Expected payer” should not be interpreted to reflect who will eventually end up paying the bill, 
only who the hospital expects to pay the bill. However, expected payer does reflect how the 
hospital would infer insurance status during the patient’s visit to the hospital. 
Generally, state records are quite similar with respect to Medicare, Medicaid, private 
insurance and patients paying out of pocket. The hospital expects a given service will be paid for 
by Medicaid, private insurance or patients themselves, respectively. However, the other two 
categories for expected payer are less easily understood. First, visits categorized as having an 
expected payer of “no charge.” In this paper, these visits are referred to as charity care patients. 
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These are visits for which the hospital does not expect to charge any individual or entity for the 
visit. These patients may or may not be indigent. The second category is the “other payer” 
category. Visits in the other payer category are expected to be paid by a variety of payers, 
including Tri-Care, the Indian Health Service, local and state indigency programs, and the Hill-
Burton Act funds (Barrett et al. 2014; Barrett et al. 2015) 
 Additional control variables included in the regression were whether the hospital was a 
rural hospital, gender, age, year, and the median income for the patient's zip code. Age is a 
continuous variable from 30 to 90. The choice to eliminate patients under 30 follows Pezzin et al. 
(2007) and is an attempt to avoid the few outlier cases associated with congenital heart problems. 
Improvement in healthcare over time is controlled for by using dummies for discharge year and 
quarter. Income variables indicate the income quartile of the median income in a patient’s zip 
code. Therefore, income variable does not measure the income of the individual patient, but the 
median income in her community. 
I also include variables to measure the overall health of the patient by calculating the 
Charlson comorbidity index.7 The Charlson index is a measure of the ten-year mortality 
probabilities developed by Charlson et al. (1987) and extended to newer coding systems by Deyo 
et al. (1992) and Quan (2005). The Charlson index assigns values from zero to six for seventeen 
different diagnosis codes and weights these values according to their mortality risk. The 
weighted values are then summed to create a single number measuring mortality risk. This was 
accomplished using the Charlson macro in STATA (Stagg 2015).8 
                                                          
7 A similar measure, the Elixhauser comorbidity score was alternatively used to measure comorbidity. The results 
were unaffected. 
8 Charlson index values were calculated using both the Stagg, 2015 measure and the macro included in the ICDPIC 
program (Clark, Osler, & Hahn 2010). The differences in index values was insubstantial. 
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The dependent variables included in the primary analyses were the probability of dying in 
the emergency room and the probability the patient was admitted to the hospital as an inpatient. 
Additionally, treatment intensity is measured by the number of procedures performed in the 
emergency department, number of procedures performed during the inpatient stay and the length 
of stay as an inpatient. Summary statistics are presented in Table III.1. Further, in Table III.2, I 
present the descriptive statistics for patients according to their insurance status. 
[Insert Table III.1 Here] 
[Insert Table III.2 Here] 
Methodology 
 The methodology used in this work is derived from Currie, MacLeod and Van Parys 
(2016). In this paper, Currie, MacLeod and Van Parys use a machine learning algorithm to 
estimate propensity scores to measure a patient’s appropriateness for surgical treatment. Using 
propensity scores helps to eliminate concerns about endogeneity between independent variables 
of interest and dependent variables. This propensity score is designed to measure overall health 
status of a patient. 
 The first step in this methodology is to model the medical condition for each patient. I 
follow the approach presented by Currie, MacLeod and Van Parys (2016) and Currie and 
MacLeod (2016) and estimate the probability of a given outcome for AMI patients. This will be 




Pr(Intensive Procedure)=F(type of AMI, gender, age, dummy variables for comorbid conditions, 
Charlson Comorbidity score, year and discharge quarter dummies) (III.1) 
Clearly, these propensity scores account only for observable variables. However, this measure 
will also reflect the effects of any unobserved variables insofar as unobserved variables vary 
systemically with the observed variables (Currie & MacLeod 2016). Additionally, the index is 
estimated using only privately insured patients at accredited teaching hospitals in hopes of 
capturing the current best practices and practices that are unaffected by insurance status. 
 Using the coefficients estimated in equations (III.1), I predict the propensity score for 
each patient in the sample as if he were treated as the average, privately insured patient at a 
teaching hospital. Next, I regress the estimated propensity score on the realized outcome in 
addition to controls. By doing this, I can estimate the effect of insurance status on an individual’s 
probability of the following outcomes (Yi):  dying in the emergency room and admission into the 
hospital using the probit function. In all regressions, I cluster standard errors at the hospital-year 
pair level. 








i(Charity) +γiXi + δi (patient 
condition index)i + εi  (III.2) 
Additionally, I use negative binomial regression to estimate the relationship between insurance 
status and treatment patterns, the number of procedures in the emergency department, number of 
procedures as an inpatient and the length of stay in the hospital. 
 Lastly, to examine the effects of the Great Recession, I examine whether the relationship 
between insurance status and heart attack outcomes changes across pre-recession, recession and 
post-recession discharges using standard NBER quarterly dating for recessions. I regress 
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insurance status on the dependent variables for discharges before the beginning of the recession, 
discharges during the recession and discharges after the end of the recession. I then use 
simultaneous estimation to estimate a robust covariance matrix for hypothesis testing across the 
time periods. 
III.IV Results 
 In this section, I present the results of the specifications described above.  Table III.3 
presents the mean patient condition scores, predicted using the estimates from equation 1 above 
conditional on health insurance status. Patient condition scores range from zero to one. For the 
individual patient, as the patient condition score goes to one, this indicates the patient is more 
likely to undergo surgical treatment.  Charity patients are, on average, the most likely to undergo 
surgical treatment and Medicare patients are the least likely. 
[Insert Table III.3 Here]  
 I next estimate the effects of insurance status on patient outcomes and treatment patterns 
conditional on the patient condition score. These results are presented in Table III.4 below. 
[Insert Table III.4 Here] 
However, because coefficients in logit and negative binomial models are difficult to interpret, I 
additionally calculate the marginal effects of health insurance. Table III.5 presents the marginal 
effects of health insurance status on mortality and admission probability.  
[Insert Table III.5 Here] 
Several results are notable. Patients with charity care are slightly less likely to die in the 
emergency department than privately insured patients, and patients paying out of pocket are 
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slightly more likely to die in the emergency department. However, the effects of health insurance 
status on admission probability are substantially larger. Patients paying out of pocket are nearly 
1.5 percentage points less likely to be admitted relative to privately insured patients. Patients 
receiving charity care are nearly six percentage points more likely to be admitted. Both Medicare 
and Medicaid patients are more than one percentage point more likely to be admitted than 
privately insured patients. 
Table III.5 also presents the marginal effects calculated from the negative binomial 
estimation results for the effects of health insurance status on the number of procedures 
performed in the emergency department, number of procedures performed as an inpatient and the 
length of inpatient stay. 
 With respect to treatment patterns, Medicare patients receive fewer emergency 
procedures and have a longer length of stay, nearly one half day longer, than privately insured 
patients. Medicaid patients receive fewer procedures in the emergency department and after 
admission and patients paying out of pocket receive fewer inpatient procedures and spend over 
one day longer in the hospital after admission. There is no significant difference between the 
effect of Medicare and Medicaid on the number of emergency department procedures. Charity 
care patients receive fewer procedures in the emergency department than privately insured 
patients, but more procedures after admission and, on average, remain in the hospital a half day 
longer than privately insured patients. Lastly, patients paying out of pocket receive fewer 
inpatient procedures, but stay slightly longer in the hospital after admission than their privately 
insured counterparts.  
III.VI The Great Recession 
52 
 
 Additionally, this data set includes the years before and after the Great Recession, which 
allows me to investigate whether the relationship between insurance status and emergency 
department behavior changes with a severe economic shock. I first estimate the patient condition 
index for patients before the recession, patients during the recession and patients after the 
recession. The time series of the patient condition index is presented in Figure III.1 for the full 
sample and by insurance status.  
[Insert Figure III.1 Here] 
Medicare patients are the least likely to undergo surgical treatment for the duration of the 
sample. And the average patient condition score for the full sample is dragged down from the 
Medicare patient condition score. The average score for Medicaid patients, self-pay patients, 
privately insured patients and charity care patients are higher than the overall average. 
 Using the NBER dating for recession, the prerecession data comes from discharges 
before the third quarter of 2007 and the post-recession data comes from discharges after the 
second quarter of 2009. Table 6 presents the marginal effects of insurance status on the 
probability of fatality in the emergency department, probability of admission, number of 
procedures performed in the emergency department, number of inpatient procedures, and the 
length of the hospital stay before, during and after the Great Recession. Table III.6 also includes 
the differences in the marginal effects between the pre-recession time period and the recession 
discharges, the recession discharges and post-recession discharges, and the difference between 
pre-recession discharges and post-recession discharges. 
[Insert Table III.6 Here] 
53 
 
 First, the most striking result is the relationship between admission probability, patients 
receiving charity care and the recession. Before the recession, patients receiving charity care 
were approximately two percentage points more likely to be admitted than privately insured 
patients; however, after the recession, these patients were more than thirteen percentage points 
more likely to be admitted. This difference is both statistically significant and economically 
interesting. It appears most of this difference, over eight percentage points occurred between the 
recession and post-recession discharges. 
 In fact, the relationship between charity care and patient treatment seems to be the most 
affected by the recession. Charity care patients become significantly less likely to die after the 
recession, more likely more likely to be admitted and receive fewer procedures in the emergency 
room. In fact, before the recession there is no statistically significant difference in the probability 
of death in the emergency department between charity care patients and privately insured 
patients, but after the recession, charity care patients are approximately one percentage point less 
likely to die in the emergency room than privately insured patients.  
Patients receiving charity care also undergo fewer procedures as inpatients and spend less 
time in the hospital after the recession than they did before the recession. Additionally, the 
differences between the effect of charity care before the recession and during the recession are 
never statistically significant. Furthermore, the differences between charity discharges during the 
recession and after the recession are always statistically significant.  
Additionally, the effects of being an uninsured patient who does not receive charity care 
are relatively unaffected by the recession. Discharges after the recession were only statistically 
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significant from discharges after the recession in the case of procedures performed in the 
emergency department.  
Medicare and Medicaid patients seemed to have less predictable results. The relationship 
between Medicare and Medicaid insurance status with the probability of death in the emergency 
department is unaffected by the recession and the relationship between Medicare on the 
probability of admission are also unaffected by the recession. However, Medicaid insurance 
status and probability of admission increase by over one percentage point between the pre-
recession discharges and recession discharges. There is no difference between the probability of 
admission during the recession and the post-recession for Medicaid patients. 
Furthermore, the relationship between Medicare insurance status and the number of 
inpatient procedures performed is also statistically different between pre-recession discharges 
and recession discharges and recession discharges and post-recession discharges. However, there 
is no statistically significant difference in the relationship between Medicare insurance and the 
number of inpatient procedures across pre-recession and post-recession discharges. In fact, the 
increase in the number of inpatient procedures between the pre-recession period and the 
recession period is exactly undone by the decrease between the recession and post-recession 
period. The relationship between Medicaid insurance status and the number of inpatient 
procedures is also statistically unchanged across the pre-recession, recession, and post-recession 
discharges. 
Lastly, the length of inpatient stays for Medicare patients are affected by the Great 
Recession. For Medicare patients, the relationship between Medicare insurance and inpatient 
length of stay increases from lengths of stay 0.4 days longer than private patients during the pre-
55 
 
recession period to one half day longer than privately insured patients during the recession. 
Again, this effect is essentially erased between the recession and post-recession time periods.  
III.VII Alternative Measures of Patient Condition 
 One concern with this type of research is the concern that the index of patient condition 
does not capture the relevant health information. Therefore, as a robustness exercise, I repeat the 
above analysis using a patient index based on the probability of fatality. Table III.7 contains the 
estimates for the average patient condition score using the alternate estimation. Figure III.2 
presents the time series of the alternate patient condition score for the full sample and by 
insurance status. 
[Insert Table III.7 Here] 
[Insert Figure III.2 Here] 
 The results for the analysis using the alternate measure of patient conditions are presented 
in table III.8 below. 
[Insert Table III.8 Here] 
The pattern of statistically significant effects of insurance status and significant differences 
across pre-recession, recession and post-recession time periods are very similar to the results 
using the initial formulation of patient condition. There are a few differences to note, however. 
First,  the effect of paying out of pocket on the likelihood of admission decreases by 0.7 a 
percentage points; paying out of pocket is associated with being 1.79 percentage points less 
likely to be admitted before the recession to being 1.05 percentage point less likely to be 
admitted after the recession with respect to similar, privately insured patients. 
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 There is even less difference between the two analyses for the number of emergency 
department procedures and inpatient procedures. For the number of emergency department 
procedures, Medicare patients receive .019 fewer procedures after the recession than during the 
recession. Once again, charity patients and patients paying out of pocket receive fewer 
procedures in the emergency department after the recession than during the recession. Patients 
receiving charity care also receive fewer procedures after the recession then they did before the 
recession.  
With respect to inpatient procedures, Medicare patients receive .175 more procedures during the 
recession than before the recession and receive .18 fewer procedures after the recession than 
during the recession. Again, the effect of the recession does not extend beyond the recession. 
Charity patients, however, receive .5 fewer procedures after the recession than during the 
recession. Lastly, for the length of stay analysis, charity care patients again see a decrease in 
their length of stay of .7 days between the recession and post-recession time periods.  
III.VIII Patients Aged under 65 
 As an additional robustness exercise, it is common in the literature investigating the 
relationships between insurance status and patient outcomes to limit the sample to patients under 
the age of 65 because patients over 65 are universally covered by Medicare. However, there are 
patients in the dataset who are under 65, but still covered by Medicare. Furthermore, by 
excluding individuals over 65, the differences in age across insurance status are substantially 
reduced. In this analysis, the patient condition index is the same index used in the first analysis. 
These results are presented below in Table III.9. 
[Insert Table III.9 Here] 
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 Once again, charity care is associated with large differences in the probability of death 
and the probability of admission across the recession time periods. Charity patients are nearly 1.5 
percentage points less likely to die in the emergency department after the recession than before 
the recession. Most of this change occurred between the recession and post-recession time 
period, 1.3 percentage points. Similarly, charity patients became over nine percentage points 
more likely to be admitted to the hospital between the recession discharges and post-recession 
discharges. There was an even larger change between pre-recession discharges and post-
recession discharges, over eleven percentage points. During these same time periods, charity 
patients received fewer emergency department procedures, fewer inpatient procedures and 
shorter lengths of stay relative to privately insured patients. 
 In addition to the relationship between the charity care provision and the recession, there 
are a few effects of the recession on outcomes and treatment for Medicare and Medicaid patients. 
Medicaid patients became more likely to be admitted relative to privately insured patients 
between pre-recession and recession discharges and between pre-recession and post-recession 
discharges. Not unexpectedly, this is coincident with an increase in the number of inpatient 
procedures between the pre-recession and post-recession time period. However, there is also an 
increase in the number of inpatient procedures for Medicaid discharges between the recession 
and post-recession time periods. On the other hand, the Medicare discharges spend relatively 
more days in the hospital from the pre-recession to recession discharges and relatively fewer 




 Given the results above, the questions arises “Why does the recession significantly affect 
the relationship between insurance status and treatment patterns and outcomes?” There are some 
significant differences in the sample across time periods. For example, patients living in 
wealthier areas before the recession and patients before the recession and during the recession 
are older than patients after the recession. 
 Perhaps of more consequence, there are differences in the patient condition index across 
time periods. For the patient condition index based on the probability of surgical intervention, 
both pre-recession discharges and recession discharges were lower than the patient index after 
the recession. When using the index based on the probability of death, pre-recession discharges 
had a lower index than did discharges during the recession and discharges after the recession. 
This index was also significantly lower for patients during the recession than for patients after 
the recession. 
 Unfortunately, none of these differences seem large enough or reliable enough to explain 
the changes in treatment patterns and outcomes. Furthermore, the changes observed in the 
relationship between insurance status and treatment outcomes are not easily condensed into a 
single phenomenon, all but guaranteeing the causal factors to be numerous and complicated. 
However, by focusing on individual changes in effects, perhaps we can gain more insight into 
the way recessions affect healthcare. 
Specifically, why is the relationship between charity care and treatment patterns between 
the recession and post-recession time periods and between pre-recession and post-recession 
discharges? The effect of charity care is significantly different between pre-recession and post-
recession discharges is exceptionally robust to specification and sample and with respect to every 
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dependent variable. The effect of charity care is also significantly different between recession 
and post-recession discharges regardless of the patient condition index, the sample and the 
outcome variable. The question, then, is what is driving these differences. Using the HCUP data, 
I can examine how patients receiving charity care may vary across pre-recession, recession, and 
post-recession discharges. 
Charity Care  
For patients receiving charity care, there are systemic and robust changes to the effects of 
insurance status on treatment patterns. Most notably, the effect of charity care on the probability 
of admission increased by double digits in every specification. Is there anything in the set of 
charity care patients that might be driving this change? 
 First, it is notable that, as a percentage of the sample, charity care was more prevalent 
before the recession than during the recession and after the recession, despite the fact patients 
were, on average, living in wealthier neighborhoods before the recession.  Additionally, when 
examining only patients receiving compensated care, the only significant difference in the 
income variable is between pre-recession and recession discharges. There is no significant 
difference between recession and post-recession discharges or pre-recession and post-recession 
discharges. Therefore, income changes are unlikely to be the cause of the change in the 
probability of admission as the change in admission probability seems to occur between 
recession and post-recession discharges. 
 There are interesting relationships between age and discharges across recession time 
periods. First, among all patients receiving charity care, there is no difference in the average age 
across all time periods. However, because age is significantly and negatively correlated with the 
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probability of receiving compensated care and because Medicare covers all patients over the age 
of 65, examining the distribution of age among patients receiving compensated care when 
limiting patients to under the age of 65. In this case, patients presenting to the emergency 
department before the recession are significantly younger than patients presenting during the 
recession and are significantly younger than patients presenting after the recession. 
 Additionally, when limiting the sample to patients receiving compensated care and under 
the age of 65, the patient index based on the probability of surgical intervention is larger in the 
recession and post-recession time periods. If physician willingness to perform surgical 
interventions increases over time, then the need for hospital admission may also increase. 
Moreover, surgical interventions are likely to dramatically increase hospital charges, which may 
increase the degree to which patients would qualify for charity care. 
 Lastly, the index based on the probability of death is larger in the pre-recession period 
than in the recession period. This may contribute to changes in the rates of admission. 
Furthermore, the analyses above demonstrate charity care patients are significantly less likely to 
die in the emergency department after the recession than before the recession. The increased 
survival could explain increased effect on admission rates.  
 However, the differences in the patients receiving charity care across the pre-recession, 
recession, and post-recession time periods are generally unsatisfying explanations of the changes 
in the relationship between insurance status and treatment patterns. While there are significant 
differences in the patients across time periods, the magnitude of these differences seem to be 




 This work illustrates the large and dynamic relationship between charity care, patient 
outcomes and treatment patterns. The nature of the charity care indicator variable is an indicator 
that the hospital does not expect to receive compensation for the care provided. Unfortunately, 
because the expectations are formed at the hospital level, the paper is insufficient to understand 
how the expectations are formed. Furthermore, this decision is largely a black box to researchers. 
We know hospitals provide care for no compensation, but there is almost no research about the 
determining factors for charity care at the hospital level. 
 However, some research has been done to describe the characteristics of patients who 
receive uncompensated care and the types of hospitals that provide more uncompensated care. 
However, there is an important difference between uncompensated care and charity care in the 
NEDS data. Generally, research on uncompensated care uses financial records and includes both 
charity care and bad debt. Bad debt are the charges that have not yet been paid, but the hospital 
still expects that they will be paid. Charity care is care the hospital does not expect to paid for at 
any point. 
 Saywell et al. (1989) present a description of Indiana uncompensated care, from both the 
patient perspective and the hospital perspective. Patients who receive uncompensated care were 
primarily single, 54% of the sample, and female, 61%. Additionally, only 44.6% of patients who 
received uncompensated care in the sample were uninsured; 46.8% of the insured patients had 
some form of commercial insurance which covered some of the costs. The size of the 
uncompensated care for each patient is below $5000 for 87.2% of the sample and 40% was under 
$500. Lastly, the hospitals providing uncompensated care was provided were majority small, 
57%, and rural hospitals, 50%. However, most of the uncompensated care cases above $5000.00 
were in large, urban hospitals. 
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 We also know increased competitive pressure decreases the amount of uncompensated 
care provided. Mann et al. (1995) demonstrate the hospitals who feel more competitive pressure 
from the expansion of managed care organizations provide less uncompensated care than other 
California hospitals. Additionally, Thorpe, Florence and Seiber (2000) use a sample of AHA 
hospitals from 1990 to 1997 to show ownership status and conversions in ownership status 
affects the amount of uncompensated care provided. In public teaching hospitals, uncompensated 
care comprises 17.6% of expenses; in not for profit and for profit hospitals, uncompensated care 
comprises 4.6% and 4% of expenditures respectively. Furthermore, hospitals that convert from 
public and not for profit status to for profit ownership decreases the amount of uncompensated 
care provided. Lastly, Choi and Chang (2007) show larger amounts of charity care are associated 
with larger profit margins for private hospitals, but are associated with smaller profit margins for 
public hospitals. 
 Unfortunately, none of this research speaks directly to the question of why some patients 
receive charity care and some do not. Nor does any of the existing research speak to why charity 
care patients are more likely to be admitted or less likely to die in the emergency department. 
This question remains open for further research. 
Affordable Care and Patient Protection Act of 2010 
 An addition factor confounding the interpretation of the effects of the recession on patient 
outcomes and patterns of treatment is the passage of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act (ACA). The massive healthcare reform law was passed and signed into law between 
December of 2009 and March of 2010 and is intended to reform healthcare financing, health 
insurance, and the provision of healthcare in substantial ways (Summary of the Affordable Care 
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Act 2013). Unfortunately, the passage of the law is nearly coincident with the end of the Great 
Recession. 
 Despite the ACA being enacted March, 2010, the provisions of the ACA were not 
scheduled to take effect immediately. Different provisions were intended to take effect in 
different years. Very few provisions took effect in 2010 and 2011, making the direct effect of the 
ACA on the impacts of insurance status unlikely. However, hospitals may have changed their 
behavior in anticipation of provisions taking place in the future. Unfortunately, the data used in 
this paper extend only to the fourth quarter of 2011, making examining the long-term effects of 
insurance on treatment patterns and patient outcomes. Specifically, an effect associated with the 
end of the recession may be expected to fade as the end of the recession recedes farther into the 
past; effects associated with the ACA may be expected to remain constant, or potentially 
increase, into the future. 
 The effect of charity care on patient outcome and treatment was the most notable result 
presented in this paper, especially the large and robust increase in the effect of receiving charity 
care on the probability of admission. The time series behavior of admissions by insurance status 
is presented below in Figure III.3. 
[Insert Figure III.3 Here] 
In Figure III.4, the time series behavior of charity admissions is plotted alone to better display 
the degree of change.  
[Insert Figure III.4 Here] 
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Over time, relative to the total number of admissions, charity admissions is small and seems to 
remain relatively constant. However, in absolute terms, the number of charity admissions 
increases greatly from the first quarter of 2010 to the second quarter of 2010. This closely tracks 
the timing of the ACA, but may also reflect a lagged effect of the recession.  
 Further research is necessary to parse the effects of the recession from the effects of the 
ACA. However, in this work, it is clear admission behavior changed between the fourth quarter 
of 2009 and the second quarter of 2010. Most significantly, the effect of charity care on the 
probability of admission increased nearly ten percentage points. However, the total number of 
admissions increased, the number of privately insured admissions and the number of Medicare 
admissions also increased substantially during the same period. 
III.X Conclusions 
 This paper examines the effects of insurance status on treatment patterns and patient 
outcomes for patients with acute myocardial infarction presenting to hospital emergency 
departments. I show there are numerous significant differences between insurance status and 
patient outcomes using a novel technique for controlling for patient condition developed in 
Currie, MacLeod, and Van Parys (2016). Additionally, the work demonstrates there are 
meaningful and robust changes in these relationships across the recent Great Recession. Most 
notably, the probability a patient receiving charity care and the probability of hospital admission 
increases by several percentage points between the recession period and the post-recession 
period. 
 This work leaves open the question of the exact mechanism of the relationship of 
insurance status and treatment patterns, whether the effect is driven by hospital behavior, 
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physician behavior, or patient behavior. It does, however, provide substantial evidence the 
relationship is not driven by the underlying patient condition. Furthermore, the work does not 
answer the question of why the recession meaningfully changes the relationships between 
insurance status and outcome variables. Additionally, the paper considers the possible effects of 
the ACA on admission behavior and leaves open several avenues for further research. 
 Lastly, this paper demonstrates large and robust differences in outcome and treatment 
between patients who receive charity care and similar patients with different expected payers. 
Unfortunately, this paper is unable to answer why these differences exist and how hospitals make 














Table I.1. Descriptive Statistics. 
 Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum 
% Change in Per Capita 
Healthcare 
Expenditures 
5.752 1.954 -0.00982 13.15 
% Change in Per Capita 
Nursing Home 
Expenditures 
4.842 3.624 -7.135 20.84 
% Change in Per Capita 
Hospital Expenditures 
5.419 3.032 -4.863 15.46 
% Change in Per Capita 
Home Healthcare 
Expenditures 
4.623 10.36 -29.96 84.38 
% Change in Per Capita 
Physician Expenditures 
5.428 3.839 -7.463 19.76 
% Change in proportion 
of population uninsured 
0.996 12.37 -48.96 46.77 
% Change in Per Capita 
Community Hospital 
Beds 
-1.274 4.161 -40.13 44.06 
% Change in African 
American  proportion 
of the population   
2.355 30.55 -33.61 775.2 
% Change in Female 
proportion of the 
population 
-0.0541 0.188 -1.565 1.598 
% Change in Over 65 
proportion of the 
population 
0.295 1.086 -6.833 4.605 
% Change in Bad 
Health Index 
2.539 9.777 -26.89 44.45 
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% Change in Real 
Income 





Table I.2.  Regression 1. 
VARIABLES COEFFICIENTS 
Growth in BHI -0.005 
 (0.006) 
Growth in Uninsurance Rate -0.003 
 (0.004) 
Growth in Community Hospital 
Beds per Capita 
0.032 
 (0.031) 
Growth in the proportion of 




Growth in the proportion of 
population that is female 
-0.584 
 (0.500) 
Growth in real income 0.088** 
 (0.040) 
Growth in the proportion of 
population that is over 65 
0.079 
 (0.095) 
Joint and Several Liability Reform -0.477** 
 (0.187) 
a. Dependent variable is percentage growth rate in per capita healthcare expenditures. 
b. Standard errors clustered by state in parentheses.  





Table I.3.Per Capita Expenditure Growth 
 Aggregate Hospital  Home Health Nursing 
Home 
Physician 
JSL -0.477** -0.117 -0.799 -0.404 -1.351** 
 (0.187) (0.596) (4.105) (0.612) (0.570) 
Ban -0.396 -0.456 0.493 0.299 -0.456 
 (0.330) (0.469) (5.429) (1.047) (1.413) 
Intent -0.097 1.051*** -2.053 -0.814 -2.192*** 
 (0.233) (0.279) (1.750) (0.599) (0.737) 
Concert -0.671 -1.034 5.300** -1.179*** -0.030 
 (0.651) (1.182) (2.355) (0.371) (0.487) 
Fifty -0.394 -0.266 3.447* -1.233* -0.041 
 (0.404) (0.662) (1.816) (0.625) (0.579) 
Blameless -0.421*** 1.196*** -2.946*** -0.184 -1.317*** 
 (0.147) (0.176) (0.858) (0.332) (0.270) 
Greater -1.188*** -2.085*** -1.394 -2.050*** -0.964*** 
 (0.154) (0.166) (0.869) (0.304) (0.251) 
Any -1.043*** -0.647 2.429 -1.846** -0.541 
 (0.282) (0.914) (1.918) (0.753) (0.756) 
a. Dependent variable is percentage growth rate in per capita healthcare expenditures.  Standard errors, in 
parentheses, are corrected by clustering at the state level. 
b. * .1 significance, **.05 significance, ***.01 significance. 
c. Controls for state-level changes in the bad health index, uninsurance rate, community hospital beds per capita, 





Table I.4.  Medicare per Enrollee Expenditure Growth 
 Aggregate Hospital  Home Health Nursing 
Home 
Physician 
JSL -0.570** -0.208 0.945 -0.355 2.390 
 (0.257) (0.335) (1.706) (0.406) (1.915) 
Ban -2.227* 1.695* -7.706** -2.738 -3.290 
 (1.228) (0.881) (3.089) (2.156) (4.361) 
Intent 0.125 -0.064 0.449 0.285 -1.036 
 (0.798) (0.400) (2.752) (0.677) (1.141) 
Concert -0.290 -0.713*** -2.989*** 0.102 -4.330*** 
 (1.163) (0.213) (0.800) (1.454) (0.992) 
Fifty -0.259 -1.036*** 0.798 -0.320 -1.026 
 (0.432) (0.340) (1.628) (0.485) (1.192) 
Blameless -1.331*** 0.147 -8.880*** 0.118 -3.312*** 
 (0.181) (0.227) (0.801) (0.190) (0.692) 
Greater -0.832*** 0.364 2.763*** -0.791*** -2.718*** 
 (0.164) (0.324) (0.689) (0.200) (0.672) 
Any -0.861* -0.836** 0.712 -0.463 -2.089 
 (0.433) (0.364) (1.975) (0.567) (1.426) 
a. Dependent variable is percentage growth rate in per Medicare enrollee healthcare expenditures.  Standard errors, 
in parentheses, are corrected by clustering at the state level. 
b. * .1 significance, **.05 significance, ***.01 significance. 
c. Controls for changes in the bad health index, uninsurance rate, community hospital beds per capita, proportion of 





Table I.5.  Per Medicaid Enrollee Expenditure Growth 
 Aggregate Hospital  Home Health Nursing 
Home 
Physician 
JSL 1.496 3.728 7.360 0.726 -1.226 
 (1.739) (4.106) (8.031) (1.373) (3.525) 
Ban 1.276 2.133 -6.817 -1.478 4.686 
 (1.791) (3.200) (6.252) (2.229) (4.285) 
Intent -2.638** -0.052 -10.089 0.376 -10.892*** 
 (1.173) (10.388) (6.493) (1.349) (2.876) 
Concert -0.870 -2.119 2.680 -2.939 11.237 
 (1.217) (2.420) (2.743) (2.599) (11.195) 
Fifty 0.179 -1.446 4.676 -0.245 -0.924 
 (1.527) (1.536) (9.834) (2.072) (3.119) 
Blameless -1.851*** -4.826*** 13.804*** -4.580*** -1.092 
 (0.666) (1.015) (2.920) (0.956) (1.222) 
Greater -0.166 1.531 1.586 0.893 -3.473*** 
 (0.665) (1.108) (2.625) (1.006) (1.171) 
Any -0.524 -2.616 15.695 -0.157 -2.297 
 (2.384) (1.790) (11.977) (3.060) (4.903) 
a. Dependent variable is percentage growth rate in per Medicaid enrollee healthcare expenditures.  Standard errors, 
in parentheses, are corrected by clustering at the state level. 
b. * .1 significance, **.05 significance, ***.01 significance. 
c. Controls for changes in the bad health index, uninsurance rate, community hospital beds per capita, proportion of 






Table I.6.  Leads for Aggregate Per Capita Expenditure Growth. 








First Lead 0.083 1.189*** 0.326 -1.185*** -0.007 0.037 
 (0.473) (0.232) (0.924) (0.437) (0.870) (0.644) 
Second 
Lead 
1.030** 0.761 1.961** 0.344 0.034 -0.587 
 (0.445) (1.672) (0.794) (0.439) (0.785) (0.713) 
Third 
Lead 
0.207 1.623** 1.578*** 0.662 0.420 0.269 
 (0.446) (0.661) (0.327) (0.451) (0.678) (0.523) 
a. Dependent variable is percentage growth rate in aggregateper capita healthcare expenditures.  Standard errors, in 
parentheses are corrected by clustering at the state level. 
b. * .1 significance, **.05 significance, ***.01 significance. 
c. Controls for changes in the bad health index, uninsurance rate, community hospital beds per capita, proportion of 





Table I.7.  Leads for Aggregate Per Enrollee Medicare Spending. 











-0.512* -2.886* -0.767 0.447 -0.297 -1.039** 
 (0.279) (1.614) (0.606) (1.510) (0.672) (0.430) 
Secon
d Lead 
0.294 -2.605* -2.737** 2.170 0.097 -0.422 
 (0.632) (1.364) (1.188) (1.326) (1.419) (1.171) 
Third 
Lead 
1.124* 1.335 -0.849*** 2.151** 0.209 -0.232 
 (0.636) (1.059) (0.240) (0.814) (1.034) (0.794) 
a. Dependent variable is percentage growth rate in aggregate per Medicare enrollee healthcare expenditures.  
Standard errors, in parentheses, are corrected by clustering at the state level. 
b. * .1 significance, **.05 significance, ***.01 significance.  
c. Controls for changes in the bad health index, uninsurance rate, community hospital beds per capita, proportion of 





Table I.8.  Leads for Aggregate Per Enrollee Medicaid Spending. 











1.485 -0.308 -1.001 0.631 1.864 0.390 
 (2.031) (0.829) (3.684) (0.922) (2.229) (2.708) 
Second 
Lead 
-0.376 2.973 1.251 4.534 5.696 1.546 
 (2.624) (8.553) (4.575) (3.912) (4.310) (4.040) 
Third 
Lead 
1.434 -5.919** 2.550 2.741 -0.291 -0.065 
 (2.631) (2.587) (6.559) (1.774) (2.942) (3.060) 
a. Dependent variable is percentage growth rate in aggregate per Medicaid enrollee healthcare expenditures.  
Standard errors, in parentheses, are corrected by clustering at the state level. 
b. * .1 significance, **.05 significance, ***.01 significance. 
c. Controls for changes in the bad health index, uninsurance rate, community hospital beds per capita, proportion of 































Table II.1. Descriptive Statistics, Full Sample 

























































































































































































































Treatment Patterns by Payer
Average Inpatient Stay Average No. IP Procedures
Average No. ED Procedures
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Table II.2. Marginal Effects, Mortality 
Variables MVA Marginal 
Effects 
Other Injury Marginal 
Effects 
   
Rural Patient -0.136*** -0.032 
 (0.046) (0.036) 
Rural Hospital 0.144** 0.051 
 (0.060) (0.020) 
Metro Patient -0.100*** 0.009 
 (0.035) (0.050) 
Metro Hospital -0.144*** -0.001 
 (0.042) (0.035) 
Charlson Index -0.577*** -0.0576*** 
 (0.0400) (0.0151) 
Income 1 0.078** -0.007 
 (0.034) (0.024) 
Income 2 0.056* 0.023 
 (0.033) (0.025) 
Income 3 -0.002 -0.056** 
 (0.032) (0.026) 
Weekend Admit -0.037 -.0.001 
 (0.023) (0.017) 
Injury Severity 0.0384*** 0.0109*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
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Teaching Hosp -0.105*** 0.034 
 (0.034) (0.022) 
Medicare 0.061 -0.044 
 (0.038) (0.033) 
Medicaid -0.076 -0.017 
 (0.051) (0.043) 
Charity Care 0.264 0.056 
 (0.169) (0.063) 
Self-Pay 0.489*** 0.143*** 
 (0.029) (0.028) 
Age 0.015*** 0.001 
 (0.008) (0.007) 
Female -0.133*** -0.108*** 
 (0.023) (0.018) 
South -0.028 0.029 
 (0.035) (0.020) 
   
Observations 395,341 145,165 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table II.3. Marginal Effects of Insurance Status on the Probability of 
Admission 
 Motor Vehicle Injury Other Injury 
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Medicare 6.85*** 8.43*** 
 (0.656) (0.708) 
Medicaid 5.74*** 6.76*** 
 (0.746) (0.915) 
Charity Care 3.54 15.1*** 
 (3.25) (3.17) 
Self Pay -8.84*** -3.42*** 
 (0.810) (0.933) 
   































       
Medicare 0.007 0.048*** 0.000 0.001 0.116*** -0.010 
 (0.010) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) 
Medicaid -0.032*** 0.231*** 0.076*** -0.022*** 0.165*** 0.028*** 
 (0.010) (0.012) (0.009) (0.006) (0.009) (0.009) 
Charity 0.207* 0.050 -0.148*** 0.052 -0.004 -0.0506 
 (0.110) (0.031) (0.035) (0.037) (0.032) (0.035) 
Self-paying -0.005 -0.057*** -0.061*** -0.010 -0.076*** -0.020** 
 (0.012) (0.010) (0.008) (0.007) (0.0094) (0.010) 
       








Table II.5. Descriptive Statistics, Sample Under Age 65 

























































































































































Table II.6. Marginal Effects of Insurance Status on Mortality, Under Age 
65 
 MVA Marginal Effects Other Injury Marginal Effects 
   
Medicare 0.130** -0.000 
 (0.054) (0.072) 
Medicaid -0.079* -0.019 
 (0.046) (0.056) 
Charity Care 0.197 0.064 
 (0.141) (0.084) 
Self-Pay 0.427*** 0.150*** 
 (0.028) (0.038) 
   





Table II.7. Admission Marginal Effects, Under 65 
 MVA Injury Other Injury 
   
Medicare 0.192 2.69*** 
 (0.738) (0.764) 
Medicaid 4.19*** 3.17*** 
 (0.725) (0.760) 
Charity  14.9*** 9.59*** 
 (2.89) (2.54) 
Self-pay -10.5*** -4.26*** 
 (0.758) (0.707) 
   








































No. of IP 
Procedures 
       
Medicare 0.034*** 0.100*** 0.005 0.025*** 0.166*** -0.0249*** 
 (0.011) (0.013) (0.011) (0.007) (0.009) (0.009) 
Medicaid -0.031*** 0.235*** 0.073*** -0.018*** 0.180*** 0.030*** 
 (0.010) (0.012) (0.009) (0.006) (0.009) (0.009) 
Charity 
Care 
0.203* 0.059* -0.146*** 0.052 0.032 -0.034 
 (0.110) (0.030) (0.035) (0.037) (0.032) (0.037) 
Self-Paying -0.004 -0.047*** -0.057*** -0.003 -0.042*** -0.015 
 (0.012) (0.010) (0.009) (0.007) (0.010) (0.010) 
       
Observation
s 
383,441 156,994 114,383 281,301 101,070 59,761 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 


























































































































Not South 46.4 24.3 22.1*** 47.3 37.9 9.47*** 
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Table II.10. Self-Paying v. Charity Patients 
 Self-Paying 









ED Proc 0.133 
(0.162) 
LOS IP -2.313*** 
(0.55) 
IP Proc -1.005*** 
(0.315) 









ED Proc 0.157* 
(0.082) 
LOS IP -0.21 
(0.39) 










Table III.1. Descriptive Statistics 
 N Mean SD 
    
Age 790,640 66.51 13.77 
Female 790,579 0.385 0.487 
Income 1 790,640 0.273 0.446 
Income 2 790,640 0.270 0.444 
Income 3 790,640 0.236 0.425 
Congestive Heart Failure 790,640 0.267 0.442 
Peripheral Vascular Disease 790,640 0.0642 0.245 
Cerebrovascular Disease 790,640 0.0519 0.222 
Dementia 790,640 0.00585 0.0763 
COPD 790,640 0.188 0.391 
Rheumatoid Disease 790,640 0.0178 0.132 
Peptic Ulcer Disease 790,640 0.00878 0.0933 
Mild Liver Disease 790,640 0.00304 0.0551 
Diabetes 790,640 0.269 0.443 
Diabetes w/ Complications 790,640 0.0424 0.201 
Hemi or Paraplegia 790,640 0.00394 0.0627 
Renal Disease 790,640 0.152 0.359 
Cancer 790,640 0.0217 0.146 
Moderate/Severe Liver Disease 790,640 0.00220 0.0468 
Metastatic Cancer 790,640 0.00878 0.0933 
AIDS 790,640 0.00143 0.0378 
100 
 
Charlson Index 790,640 1.616 0.486 
Rural Hospital 790,640 0.0818 0.274 
Medicare 790,640 0.570 0.495 
Medicaid 790,640 0.0603 0.238 
Private Ins. 790,640 0.281 0.450 
Self-Pay 790,640 0.0692 0.254 
Charity Care 790,640 0.00645 0.0801 
Prob. of Death in the ED 790,640 0.00995 0.0992 
Prob. of Admission 790,640 0.826 0.379 
No. of ED Procedures 105,289 1.489 2.887 
Inpatient Length of Stay 653,116 4.766 5.438 














































































































































































































































































































































***The averages for probability of death in the emergency department, probability of admission, the number of 
emergency department procedures, number of inpatient procedures, and the length of inpatient stay were statistically 




Table III.3. Patient Condition Score by Insurance Status 
 Private Medicare Medicaid Uninsured Charity 
Patient 
Mean 0.785*** 0.590*** 0.763*** 0.798*** 0.821*** 
SE 0.192 0.210 0.192 0.201 0.167 
Observations 222,395 450,590 47,656 54,715 5,102 
***The averages for probability of death in the emergency department, probability of admission, the number of 
emergency department procedures, number of inpatient procedures, and the length of inpatient stay were statistically 






Table III.4. Coefficients for Effects of Insurance Status on Treatment Patterns 




IP Length of 
Stay 
      
Rural Hospital 0.0576 -1.211*** 0.636*** -0.184*** -0.161*** 
 (0.0561) (0.0542) (0.0974) (0.0235) (0.0129) 
Charlson Index -1.084*** 1.482*** -0.715*** -0.00795** 0.384*** 
 (0.0429) (0.0380) (0.0414) (0.00348) (0.00438) 
Income 1 0.0794 -0.278*** 0.198* -0.0661*** 0.0253*** 
 (0.0633) (0.0551) (0.118) (0.0148) (0.00906) 
Income 2 0.0826 -0.388*** 0.524*** -0.0356*** 0.0139 
 (0.0664) (0.0572) (0.116) (0.0134) (0.00861) 
Income 3 0.0198 -0.140*** 0.179*** -0.00536 0.0108 
 (0.0509) (0.0380) (0.0639) (0.0108) (0.00769) 
Weekend Admit 0.0645** -0.00227 -0.0115 -0.0158*** 0.0129*** 
 (0.0306) (0.00982) (0.0255) (0.00272) (0.00345) 
Teaching 
Hospital 
-0.0183 1.465*** -0.412* 0.251*** 0.180*** 
 (0.0762) (0.151) (0.216) (0.0165) (0.0103) 
Medicare 0.0715 0.195*** -0.118** 0.00187 0.0975*** 
 (0.0509) (0.0223) (0.0464) (0.00493) (0.00522) 
Medicaid 0.0314 0.152*** -0.208*** -0.0470*** 0.255*** 
 (0.0804) (0.0274) (0.0546) (0.00869) (0.0104) 
Charity -0.430* 0.682*** -1.459*** 0.0570*** 0.0983*** 
 (0.221) (0.105) (0.192) (0.0185) (0.0216) 
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Self-pay 0.570*** -0.159*** -0.0165 -0.0510*** 0.0455*** 
 (0.0585) (0.0297) (0.0498) (0.00652) (0.00833) 
Age 0.0140*** 0.0337*** -0.0192*** -0.00507*** 0.00462*** 
 (0.00176) (0.000945) (0.00157) (0.000220) (0.000203) 
Female -0.192*** 0.197*** -0.0642*** -0.0831*** -0.00912*** 
 (0.0296) (0.0108) (0.0215) (0.00299) (0.00325) 
Midwest Region -0.323*** -0.0247 0.642*** 0.253*** -0.0515*** 
 (0.0730) (0.0776) (0.113) (0.0266) (0.0146) 
Southern Region 0.0522 0.00794 2.177*** 0.185*** 0.0196 
 (0.0801) (0.0987) (0.170) (0.0278) (0.0143) 
West -0.187*** 0.377*** -0.858*** 0.242*** -0.0482*** 
 (0.0704) (0.0930) (0.157) (0.0326) (0.0177) 
Patient 
Condition Index 
-3.437*** 4.021*** -0.975*** 1.449*** -0.298*** 
 (0.0781) (0.0965) (0.123) (0.0189) (0.0143) 
Constant -1.786*** -5.846*** -0.246 0.564*** 0.652*** 
 (0.158) (0.202) (0.235) (0.0362) (0.0254) 
      
Observations 790,424 781,095 790,424 653,082 653,079 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table III.5. Marginal Effects of Insurance Status on Treatment Patterns 





IP Length of 
Stay 
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Medicare 0.0433 1.789*** -0.0108*** 0.00829 0.448*** 
 (0.0308) (0.210) (0.00417) (0.0218) (0.0241) 
Medicaid 0.0190 1.399*** -0.0189*** -0.208*** 1.173*** 
 (0.0488) (0.260) (0.00501) (0.0385) (0.0483) 
Charity Care -0.261* 6.268*** -0.133*** 0.253*** 0.452*** 
 (0.135) (1.112) (0.0230) (0.0818) (0.0993) 
Self-Pay 0.345*** -1.466*** -0.00150 -0.226*** 0.209*** 
 (0.0371) (0.253) (0.00456) (0.0290) (0.0383) 
      
Observations 790,424 781,095 790,424 653,082 653,079 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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2006:Q1 2008:Q1 2010:Q1 2011:Q3
Year: Quarter
Ave. PCI Ave. Self-Pay PCI
Ave. Charity Care PCI Ave. Medicaid PCI
Ave. Medicare PCI Ave. Private PCI
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Table III.6. Differences in Marginal Effects of Outcome and Treatment by Insurance Status and the 
Great Recession.  




































































































































































































































































Self-Pay -0.235*** -0.015 -0.250*** 0.022 -0.228*** 0.007 
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(0.0493) (0.0496) (0.0429) 






































































Table III.7. Alternative Patient Condition Score by Time Period 
 Pre-Recession Recession Post-Recession 
Mean 0.0151*** 0.0115*** 0.0163*** 
SE 0.039 0.0263 0.0472 
Observations 145,492 167,888 374,260 
***The averages for probability of death in the emergency department, probability of admission, the number of 
emergency department procedures, number of inpatient procedures, and the length of inpatient stay were statistically 





Table III.8. Differences in Marginal Effects for Outcome and Treatment by Insurance Status and the 
Great Recession. Alternate Condition Index.  




























































































































































































































































Self-Pay -0.230*** -0.052 -0.282*** 0.053 -0.229*** 0.001 
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(0.0526) (0.0538) (0.0448) 





































































Table III.9. Differences in Marginal Effects for Outcome and Treatment by Insurance Status and the 
Great Recession.  
Under 65. 






















































































































Self-Pay -1.917*** -0.134 -2.051*** -0.231 -2.282*** -0.365 
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(0.439) (0.386) (0.506) 












































































































































































































































2006:Q1 2008: Q12007:Q1 2009:Q1 2010:Q1 2011:Q1
Year: Quarter
Priv. Adm. Medicare Adm
Medicaid Adm Charity Adm.
Self-pay Adm. Total Adm.
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Table I.A1.  Literature Summary 















Average claims in 
Indiana were 
larger than those 
in either Ohio or 
Michigan, which 
did not pass any 
tort reform during 






































lower growth in 
malpractice claim 




























































The average effect 
of the physician to 
population ratio is 














JSL has a slightly 
negative effect on 
the complication 
rate. 





Log of positive 
malpractice 
payouts by state 
Damage 
caps 
No reduction in 
the frequency of 
malpractice 
payouts as a result 











































































Table I.A2.  States with Joint and Several Reforms. 
Type of Reform Number of States 
Joint and Several Liability Reform 37 
Ban 9 
50% Liability  11 
Defendant Greater Liability 7 
Blameless Plaintiff 4 
Intentional Actions 8 

















      
JSL -0.477 0.187 0.132 -2.551** -3.614*** 
Ban -0.396 0.330 0.167 -1.200 -2.371** 
Intent -0.097 0.233 0.177 -0.416 -0.548 
Concert -0.671 0.651 0.177 -1.031 -3.791*** 
Fifty -0.394 0.404 0.162 -0.978 -2.432** 
Blameless -0.421 0.147 0.234 -2.864*** -1.799* 
Greater -1.188 0.154 0.315 -7.714*** -3.771*** 
Any -1.043 0.282 0.134 -3.699*** -7.784*** 
a. Dependent variable is percentage growth rate in aggregated per capita healthcare expenditures.  Standard errors, in 
parentheses, are corrected by clustering at the state level. 
b. * .1 significance, **.05 significance, ***.01 significance. 
c. Controls for state-level changes in the bad health index, uninsurance rate, community hospital beds per capita, 























      
JSL -0.570 0.257 0.172 -2.218** -3.314*** 
Ban -2.227 1.228 0.214 -1.814* -10.407*** 
Intent 0.125 0.798 0.226 0.157 0.553 
Concert -0.290 1.163 0.231 -0.249 -1.255 
Fifty -0.259 0.432 0.206 -0.600 -1.257 
Blameless -1.331 0.181 0.304 -7.354*** -4.378*** 
Greater -0.832 0.164 0.426 -5.073*** -1.953* 
Any -0.861 0.433 0.175 -1.988** -4.920*** 
a. Dependent variable is percentage growth rate in aggregated per enrollee Medicare healthcare expenditures.  
Standard errors, in parentheses, are corrected by clustering at the state level. 
b. * .1 significance, **.05 significance, ***.01 significance. 
c. Controls for state-level changes in the bad health index, uninsurance rate, community hospital beds per capita, 



















      
JSL 1.496 1.739 0.771 0.860 1.940* 
Ban 1.276 1.791 0.978 0.712 1.305 
Intent -2.638 1.173 1.033 -2.249** -2.554** 
Concert -0.870 1.217 1.052 -0.715 -0.827 
Fifty 0.179 1.527 0.958 0.117 0.187 
Blameless -1.851 0.666 1.328 -2.780*** -1.394 
Greater -0.166 0.665 1.852 -0.250 -0.090 
Any -0.524 2.384 0.802 -0.220 -0.653 
a. Dependent variable is percentage growth rate in aggregated per enrollee Medicaid healthcare expenditures.  
Standard errors, in parentheses, are corrected by clustering at the state level. 
b. * .1 significance, **.05 significance, ***.01 significance. 
c. Controls for state-level changes in the bad health index, uninsurance rate, community hospital beds per capita, 






Appendix Table III.1. Differences in Outcome and Treatment by Insurance Status and the Great Recession. Regression 
Coefficients. 



































































































































































































































Medicare 0.0998 0.0152 0.115 -0.0231* 0.0919 -0.0079 
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Appendix Table III.2. Differences in Outcome and Treatment by Insurance Status and the Great Recession. Alternate Patient 
Condition Index. Regression Coefficients. 








































































































































































































































Medicare 0.0740*** 0.044*** 0.118*** -0.0184 0.0996*** 0.0256**  
134 
 



































Appendix Table III.3. Differences in Outcome and Treatment by Insurance Status and the Great Recession. Under 65. 
Regression Coefficients. 



































































































































































































































Medicare 0.109*** 0.035* 0.144*** -0.036* 0.108*** -0.001 
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